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ARTICLE
THE SCHEME OF ENUMERATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
NEW FEDERALISM IN THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT
SHLOMO SLONIM1
Proponents of the New Federalism, including justices of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, have adopted the premise that federalism was introduced into
the Constitution by the Founding Fathers in order to diffuse power between
the central government and the states, even as the separation of powers was
designed to diffuse power between the three branches of the federal govern-
ment. From this premise it follows that judicial supervision of relations be-
tween national center and state periphery should be applied in the spirit of
dual federalism, under which both parties are deemed to be sovereign. The
purpose of the present study is to trace the origins of federalism at the 1787
Constitutional Convention and thereby gauge the strength of the above
thesis.
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I. THE NEW FEDERALISM: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2
A. From McCulloch to Dual Federalism and Back
During the 1930s the United States, as is well known, experienced two
revolutions: first, a social-economic revolution in the form of the New Deal,
and second, a judicial revolution whereby changes in the Supreme Court led
to an expansive view of federal power and the validation of the New Deal
program.3 In truth, the jurisprudence of the Court was not new; it was sim-
ply a return to the broad interpretation of the Constitution by Chief Justice
John Marshall, as reflected in his historic decision in McCulloch v. Mary-
land.4 On the basis of a doctrine of implied powers derived from the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, that celebrated decision found that the federal
government was qualified to create a national bank, the Tenth Amendment
did not restrict that power, and any attempt by a state to defeat that goal by
taxing the institution was a violation of the supremacy clause, and hence
unconstitutional.
In the intervening period, from before the Civil War to the 1930s, the
Court had adopted a restrictive view based on a doctrine of dual federalism.
Under this doctrine, enunciated by Chief Justice Roger Taney, the Court
postulated that the national and state levels of government were coequal
sovereignties, each supreme within its own sphere.5 Dual federalism placed
particular stress on the Tenth Amendment as assuring the states that their
reserved powers would be unfettered by federal regulation. Federal inter-
2. This survey of American federalism is not intended to be exhaustive. It focuses on the
fluctuations that have characterized the Court’s approach. In the preparation of this survey, I have
drawn on the extensive writings of Mark Killenbeck on the evolution of the New Federalism.
3. The term “revolution” is used here in the sense employed by Bruce Ackerman in his
innovative analysis of the stages of jurisprudential and extra-jurisprudential development in the
United States. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS
(Harvard Univ. Press, 1991 & 1998).
4. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
5. For an outstanding summary of the influence of dual federalism in Supreme Court juris-
prudence, see the relevant chapters in ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON, AND HERMAN
BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (Norton, 6th ed., 1983).
The foremost authority on the subject, Edward S. Corwin, defined the doctrine in terms of four
postulates: 1) the national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2) the purposes it may
constitutionally promote are few; 3) within their respective spheres, the federal and state govern-
ments are sovereign and hence equal; and 4) relations between the two centers are characterized
by tension rather than collaboration. See The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 4
(1950).
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vention in areas reserved for the states could not prevail over state legisla-
tion since this would violate state sovereignty.
The climax of dual federalism, according to most authorities, was
reached in the Hammer v. Dagenhart decision of 1918,6 which declared that
a federal law barring interstate traffic in goods produced by child labor was
unconstitutional. The purpose of the law, said the Court, was to forbid child
labor and not the regulation of interstate commerce. Since child labor was
not an enumerated power of the national government, its regulation was
beyond the power of Congress. Justice William R. Day, author of the ma-
jority opinion, wrote: “The grant of authority over a purely federal matter
[such as commerce] was not intended to destroy the local power always
existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment.”7 In
citing that amendment, he went on to misquote it by asserting that “the
powers not expressly delegated to the National Government are reserved”
to the states and the people.8 The word “expressly” does not appear in the
Tenth Amendment, and its absence was highlighted in Marshall’s McCul-
loch opinion as an indication that the Tenth Amendment was not intended
to impinge on the doctrine of implied powers.
With the new appointments to the Court, the doctrine of implied pow-
ers was revived, while the Tenth Amendment was defanged and classified
as a truism that added no new authority to the powers automatically re-
served to the states by virtue of the federal character of the Constitution.
State sovereignty was relegated to the margin, as national schemes in innu-
merable spheres were accorded priority for their promotion of national and
social welfare.
Two cases, in particular, illustrate the revolution that returned the
United States to the expansive jurisprudence of an earlier age. The first case
is that of United States v. Darby,9 decided in 1941. A lumber firm engaged
purely in local matters in Georgia was charged with violating the federal
law regulating the hours and wages of its employees. The firm argued that
the law was unconstitutional, first, because manufacturing was not com-
merce, and second, because the company was engaged in local business
only. The law thus represented an attempt by Congress to extend its author-
ity into purely state affairs. Justice Stone, in a unanimous opinion, rejected
this argument on the ground that “the motive and purpose of a regulation of
interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon which the
Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no
6. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). “The theory of dual federalism received its clearest statement in
Hammer v. Dagenhart.” C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 66 (McGraw-
Hill, 1959).
7. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 274.
8. Id. at 275.
9. See 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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control.”10 Since Hammer v. Dagenhart deviated from this longstanding
principle, it was overruled. Congress has power over intrastate commerce,
Stone said, if it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. He added
that the Court’s conclusion was “unaffected by the Tenth Amendment
which . . . states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state
governments” as established by the Constitution. It was introduced to “al-
lay” the fears of the states, but changed nothing.11
The second case, Wickard v. Filburn,12 demonstrates the reach of the
federal interstate commerce power. Filburn, a farmer, violated regulations
prescribed under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 by growing more
than his allotted quota of wheat. Filburn argued that his wheat never left the
farm and was fed exclusively to his livestock. Since it was not in com-
merce, it was beyond the interstate commerce power of Congress.13 The
Court ruled that although the impact of Filburn’s consumption of the wheat
was indirect and minor, nonetheless, it had an effect on interstate com-
merce, since he would otherwise have been compelled to go out into the
market and purchase that quantity of wheat to feed his livestock. Many
farmers might grow crops beyond their quotas and keep the product within
the farm, but the result then would be extensive and harmful. Therefore,
Filburn’s action came within the embrace of the Commerce Clause, and the
law was declared constitutional. The upshot of these two decisions was that
once Congress undertakes to adopt legislation under the Commerce Clause,
the courts will not search beneath the surface of the law to determine how
substantive an association with commerce really exists.
In the wake of these and similar decisions, the Doyen of constitutional
analysis at that time, Edward S. Corwin, was prompted to publish a law
article entitled: “The Passing of Dual Federalism.”14 For some forty years
Congress had free reign. During this period the federal government adopted
numerous social welfare laws, applicable throughout the country, designed
to improve the lives of American citizens. Rarely in that era did a measure
based on the Commerce Clause come before the Court on the ground that it
lacked constitutional license.
B. The Rehnquist Court and the Emergence of the New Federalism
Change came to the Court in 1971, with the appointment of Associate
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who strongly espoused a philosophy of
states’ rights. He expressed his views in several cases, but it was only in
10. Id. at 115.
11. Id. at 123–24.
12. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
13. See id. at 112–14.
14. Corwin, supra note 5, at 1–24.
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1976, in the case of National League of Cities v. Usery, that he was able to
prevail and secure a majority.15
The opinion, delivered by Rehnquist, declared unconstitutional an
amendment to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act extending federal hours
and wages regulations to nearly all state employees. The Court said that the
Act spoke “directly to the States qua States.”16 But “there are limits upon
the power of Congress to override state sovereignty.”17 “A State . . . is itself
a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing
our Federal Union.”18 It was an “undoubted attribute of state sovereignty”
for a state to be free to fix the wages and hours of its employees.19 Rehn-
quist cited the famous 1869 pronouncement of Chief Justice Salmon P.
Chase: “The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States.”20 As a result, “this exercise of
congressional authority does not comport with the federal system of gov-
ernment embodied in the Constitution.”21 In a powerful dissent, Justice
Brennan argued that the Court’s opinion repudiated “principles governing
judicial interpretation” since John Marshall established that “restraints upon
exercise by Congress of its plenary commerce power lie in the political
process, and not in the judicial process.”22
The National League of Cities ruling did not survive for even a decade.
It was overridden in the 1985 decision of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority,23 because of the complexity of sorting out which
state employees should be immune from federal regulation and which
should not.24 The Garcia opinion, authored by Justice Harry Blackmun,
echoed Brennan’s dissent in National League by noting that state interests
were most effectively protected by means of state participation in the Con-
gress. Citing the writings of Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper, the Court
declared: “The political process insures that laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated.”25
15. See 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Timothy J. Conlan and Francois Vergniolle de Chantal present
a pithy summary of the New Federalism cases in the opening part of their incisive article, The
Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federalism, 116 POL. SCI. Q. 253 (2001). The
second half of their paper analyzes the implications of the New Federalism doctrine for the future
of the United States.
16. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976).
17. Id. at 842.
18. Id. at 849.
19. Id. at 845.
20. Id. at 844 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869)).
21. Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
22. Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
24. This was apparently the issue that led Justice Blackmun to switch sides, support the
majority in Garcia, and write the opinion of the Court.
25. 469 U.S. at 556 (emphasis in original).
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Nonetheless, the National League opinion is important for spelling out
the critical issues that the New Federalism doctrine, launched by the Chief
Justice, embraces. It is, so to speak, the foundational manifesto relied upon
by each of the succeeding cases in assessing how extensively a protective
screen operates to provide state immunity from federal impositions. Na-
tional League spotlights the following interrelated issues: 1) state sover-
eignty; 2) whether the federal law is directed to the states, as such, or to
individuals; 3) dual federalism as the underlying principle of the Constitu-
tion; 4) the proposition that the Constitution assumed that the states, within
their realm of authority, will be free to operate without outside dictation;
and 5) whether the Tenth Amendment is more than just a truism.
In explication of these issues, the Court, in the 1991 decision Gregory
v. Ashcroft,26 decided that the provision in Missouri’s constitution that man-
dated a retirement age of seventy for judges did not violate the federal Age
Discrimination Act. “As every schoolchild learns,” said Justice Sandra
O’Connor in her majority opinion, “our Constitution establishes a system of
dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government.”27 Conse-
quently, Missouri’s freedom of action in this instance was sustained by the
Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause of the Constitution.
In 1992, in New York v. United States,28 Justice O’Connor had a fur-
ther opportunity to expound on the sovereignty of the states. In 1985, Con-
gress had adopted a law requiring the states to take title for radioactive
waste and penalized them if they failed to do so.29 In her opinion for the
Court, O’Connor ruled that the Constitution did not permit Congress to
“commandeer” the states “to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram.”30 Citing the record of the Constitutional Convention, she held that
“the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States.”31 Consequently, “whether one
views the take title provision as lying outside Congress’ enumerated pow-
ers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure
of our Government established by the Constitution.”32 Further, she said:
“State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies
of the Federal Government.”33 In dissent, Justices Bryon R. White, Harry
Blackmun, and John Paul Stevens contended, inter alia, that the historical
record in no way denied Congress the right to order the states to carry out
26. See 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
27. Id. at 457.
28. See 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
29. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat.
1842.
30. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
31. Id. at 166.
32. Id. at 177.
33. Id. at 188.
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federal programs, even as it permitted Congress to oblige individuals to do
so.34 In a separate opinion,35 Justice Stevens noted that under the Articles of
Confederation, the Federal Government had the power to issue commands
to the States. Because that power was insufficient for national purposes, the
Framers supplemented that power by authorizing the Federal Government
to command individuals as well. “Nothing in that history suggests that the
Federal Government may not also impose its will upon the several States as
it did under the Articles. The Constitution enhanced, rather than diminished,
the power of the Federal Government.”36
Several subsequent cases demonstrated the far reach of the New Feder-
alism doctrine. In 1995, in United States v. Lopez,37 Chief Justice Rehnquist
for the Court majority ruled that the federal Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990 was unconstitutional. The Act, adopted under the commerce power,
made it a federal offense to be carrying a firearm within a school zone.38
Rehnquist declared that possession of a gun in a school zone had nothing to
do with interstate commerce, and the attempt of Congress to regulate such a
matter was quite beyond its powers. To acknowledge that Congress could
legislate on such a matter would, in effect, “convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained
by the States.”39
The 1997 decision Printz v. United States followed on quite naturally
from New York v. United States in holding that Congress could not compel
a state to enact or implement certain legislation.40 Congress had enacted the
Brady Handgun Act, which, inter alia, required state law enforcement of-
ficers to conduct background checks on prospective purchasers of hand-
guns. The Act was declared unconstitutional on the ground that the Federal
Government could not circumvent the New York decision by conscripting a
state’s officers directly. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, de-
clared that “such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our con-
stitutional system of dual sovereignty.”41 “The Framers,” he said, “rejected
the concept of a central government that would act upon and through the
States [as the Articles of Confederation did], and instead designed a system
34. Id. at 188 (White, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 210 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
36. New York, 505 U.S. at 211.
37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) (1988 ed. Supp. V).
39. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. In the wake of Lopez, Congress in 1996 adopted an amendment
to the earlier law that had been invalidated. Under the new legislation, Congress found that crime
at the local level was “exacerbated by the interstate movement of drugs, guns, and criminal
gangs”; that violent crimes in school zones affected the quality of education; and that the Com-
merce Clause empowered Congress to adopt this legislation. To date, the constitutionality of this
Act has not been challenged in court. See LOUIS FISHER & KATY J. HARRIGER, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 355 (Carolina Academic Press, 10th ed. 2013).
40. See 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
41. Id. at 935.
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in which the state and federal governments would exercise concurrent au-
thority over the people.”42 Quoting the New York case, he said: “The Fed-
eral Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”43 Scalia rejected the minority argument that was
based on the Commerce Clause coupled with the Necessary and Proper
Clause, because in this instance, reliance on the Commerce Clause violated
state sovereignty and was therefore an act of usurpation.44 Interestingly,
although Scalia mentioned the Tenth Amendment as confirming “residual
state sovereignty,”45 he did not invalidate the Brady Law on this basis.46 In
contrast, both Justices O’Connor and Thomas, in their concurring opinions,
cited the Tenth Amendment as the crucial factor for declaring the law
unconstitutional.47
The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer) firmly dismissed the idea that the Tenth Amendment
could justify “a rule that immunizes local officials from obligations that
might be imposed on ordinary citizens.”48 The Court’s opinion, charged
Stevens, was “bereft of support in the history of the founding.”49 He cited
the conclusion in Garcia: “The principal means chosen by the Framers to
ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself.”50
In another 1997 case, City of Boerne v. Flores,51 the Court held that
Congress had overstepped its bounds in adopting the 1993 Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA), based ostensibly on its powers under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case involved an application by Pat-
rick Flores, Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, for a permit to expand the
church building in Boerne, Texas. Local zoning authorities rejected the ap-
plication on the ground that the proposed changes would harm the historical
character of the district. Flores countered by referring to RFRA, requiring a
strict scrutiny standard to determine a compelling government interest in
any case substantially burdening the free exercise of religion. The majority
opinion by Justice Kennedy held that the right to define the substantive
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment resided exclusively in the
Court, and Congress’ attempt to set its own standard was unconstitutional.
RFRA, it was said, represents “a considerable Congressional intrusion into
42. Id. at 920–21.
43. Id. at 926.
44. Id. at 923–24.
45. Id. at 919.
46. 521 U.S. at 935.
47. Id. at 935–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 936–39 (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 942 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 948.
50. Id. at 955.
51. See 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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the States’ traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the
health and welfare of their citizens.”52
It is noteworthy that the Eleventh Amendment was also enlisted in the
majority’s campaign to compel respect for state sovereignty, a campaign
that the late Professor Gerald Gunther labeled “the antifederalist revival of
the 1990s.”53 Casinos on Indian reservations had become a major business,
and in 1988 the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was adopted by Congress,
setting out procedures for negotiations between the Indian tribe and the
state involved. In the event that the state failed to negotiate, the tribe could
sue in federal court to obtain satisfaction. In the 1996 decision, Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,54 the Court majority ruled that Congress lacks
power to “abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity,” and consequently, the
law “cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that does not consent to be
sued.”55 The decision cited the Eleventh Amendment, which confirmed—
and did not establish—a state’s sovereign immunity from suits, whether in
a diversity claim by a citizen of a different state or in a suit by a citizen of
the same state.
In the 1999 decision of Alden v. Maine,56 the Court majority endorsed
its thesis regarding the sovereign immunity of states against unauthorized
jurisdiction to sue, and extended it to lawsuits against states in state courts.
Alden and other probation officers had sued Maine for failing to observe
the overtime provisions of the federal Labor Standards Act. Citing Seminole
Tribe, the Court ruled that federal powers under the Constitution “do not
include the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for dam-
ages in state courts.”57 The Court considered that reliance on the Eleventh
Amendment to justify state immunity from private suits was misplaced
since “the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is lim-
ited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.58 . . . States’ immunity from
suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution.”59 The Tenth Amendment af-
firms this sovereignty and thus presumes that the states will be duly ac-
corded “the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status.”60 The
opinion also referred to the postulate enunciated in New York v. United
States that the Constitutional Convention explicitly substituted the right of
52. Id. at 534.
53. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225 (West Pub-
lishing, 13th ed. 1997).
54. See 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
55. Id. at 47.
56. See 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
57. Id. at 712.
58. Id. at 713. This thesis is quite remarkable, since it reduces the Eleventh Amendment to a
superfluity.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 714.
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the federal government to regulate individuals in place of regulating states.
In conclusion, the Court said that Congress “must accord States the esteem
due to them as joint participants in a federal system.”61
In his dissent, Justice Souter wondered on what constitutional basis the
Court had ascribed sovereign immunity to the states.62 In Seminole Tribe,
the majority held that sovereign immunity derived from the Eleventh
Amendment; however, now the Court finds that the Eleventh Amendment is
not really required, since “sovereign immunity from all individual suits is ‘a
fundamental aspect’ of state sovereignty ‘confirmed’ by the Tenth Amend-
ment.63 . . . But there is no evidence that the Tenth Amendment constitu-
tionalized a concept of sovereign immunity as inherent in the notion of
statehood.”64 If it derives from the common law, then it follows that Con-
gress is qualified, by means of its powers under Article I, together with the
Supremacy Clause, to abrogate that immunity. Prior to independence, said
Souter, the Crown alone possessed sovereign immunity. “The Court calls
‘immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity,’ and assumes that
this ‘dignity’ is a quality easily translated from the person of the King to the
participatory abstraction of a republican State.”65
The Court also relied on sovereign immunity of states to invalidate the
provision in the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act that al-
lowed state employees to sue the state for violation of that law. In the 2000
case, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,66 the plaintiffs did not rely on the
Commerce Clause (in view of Seminole Tribe), but based their argument on
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to bring suit against Florida. In
rejecting this avenue, Justice O’Connor said it was not “appropriate.”67 The
abrogation of the states’ sovereign immunity “exceeded Congress’ author-
ity.”68 “The Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits
against nonconsenting States.”69
Justice Stevens, on behalf of the dissenters, vigorously challenged the
majority opinion. “Congress’ power to regulate the American economy in-
cludes the power to regulate both the public and private sectors of the labor
market.”70 The Framers, he said, had not selected “the Judicial Branch as
the constitutional guardian of . . . state interests.”71 They relied on the legis-
lative process, in particular the states’ equal representation in the Senate,
61. Id. at 758.
62. Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 760–61.
64. Id. at 761.
65. Id. at 802.
66. See 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
67. Id. at 82.
68. Id. at 67.
69. Id. at 73.
70. Id. at 92–93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 93.
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“to defend state interests from undue infringement.72 . . . There is not a
word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court’s conclusion that
the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits Congress’ power to
authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to enforce federal law
against the States.”73
In the widely criticized 2000 decision United States v. Morrison,74 the
Court denied relief to a woman who had brought suit under the federal
Violence Against Women Act of 1994. Christy Brzonkala charged that she
had been gang-raped by two members of the football team at Virginia Poly-
technic Institute, one of whom was Antonio J. Morrison. She brought suit
against Morrison under the 1994 Act, which provided a “federal civil rem-
edy for a victim of gender-motivated violence.”75 In rejecting the suit, the
Court based itself on Lopez and two nineteenth century decisions on civil
rights. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion noted that Congress had
predicated the law both on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and on
the Commerce Clause. Reliance on the Commerce Clause was dismissed,
despite the congressional assertion that violent gender crimes seriously af-
fected interstate commerce, because such “reasoning would allow Congress
to regulate any crime” nationwide.76 The connection with interstate com-
merce was regarded as too ephemeral and insubstantial.
Nor did the Court accept the argument based on the Fourteenth
Amendment, since it held that that provision only provides for federal legis-
lation in instances where state action is involved. The “voluminous” evi-
dence presented to the Court of “bias in various state justice systems against
victims of gender-motivated violence” was deemed insufficient to validate
the federal law.77 The Fourteenth Amendment was subject to certain limita-
tions, said the Court, “to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterat-
ing the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and
the National Government.”78 Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion,
maintained that the “substantial effects” test under the Commerce Clause
was inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers.79
Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion, rejected the argument that the
Lopez decision controlled the case, since in adopting the present law, Con-
gress had taken care to present a “mountain of data . . . showing the effects
of violence against women on interstate commerce.”80 “The Act,” Souter
said, “would have passed muster at any time between Wickard in 1942 and
72. 528 U.S. at 93
73. Id. at 96.
74. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(b).
76. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
77. Id. at 619.
78. Id. at 620.
79. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 628–29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Lopez in 1995,” by virtue of the understanding that the Commerce Clause,
in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause, sanctioned congres-
sional initiatives to deal with “all activity that, when aggregated, has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce.”81 He cited some of the findings
upon which Congress had based itself that demonstrated that violence
against women was a national calamity in its effect upon interstate com-
merce, demanding national action. For this reason, he said, Attorneys Gen-
eral from no less than thirty-eight states had urged Congress to adopt the
legislation. Given his view of the validity of the law on the basis of the
Clause, Souter found no need to analyze the Fourteenth Amendment
argument.
In each of the above cases, the Supreme Court—by the standard 5-4
split—declared unconstitutional federal attempts to institute national legis-
lation in relation to social affairs, as unauthorized extensions of federal
power. In the 1995 case U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,82 the division in the
Court went in the reverse direction. State legislation was declared to be an
unconstitutional arrogation of power. By a 5-4 vote, thanks to the defection
of Justice Kennedy from the erstwhile conservative majority, the Court in-
validated Arkansas’ attempt to modify the Constitution’s enunciation of
qualifications for election to the national legislature.
In a 1992 referendum, the people of Arkansas had adopted an amend-
ment to the state constitution barring a candidate who had served three
terms in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate from plac-
ing his name in a further general election ballot. This attempt by a state to
add to the qualifications for candidates spelled out in Article I of the Consti-
tution was held to be “inconsistent with the Framers’ vision of a uniform
National Legislature representing the people of the United States.”83 The
Court opinion relied heavily on the 1969 decision of Powell v. McCor-
mack,84 which ruled that Congress was precluded from adding to the quali-
fications for members of Congress enumerated in the Constitution, so as to
deny membership to a legally elected member. The qualifications for mem-
bership in the House were “fixed and exclusive.”85
In similar fashion, the Court held that Arkansas was precluded from
adding qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution for candidates
for federal office in the national legislature. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy expounded upon the federal character of the National Union:
It is well settled that the whole people of the United States as-
serted their political identity and unity of purpose when they cre-
ated the federal system. . . . Federalism was our Nation’s own
81. Id. at 637.
82. See 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
83. Id. at 783.
84. See 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
85. See 514 U.S. 779, 790 (1995).
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discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the
genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political ca-
pacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion
by the other.86 . . . It might be objected that because the States
ratified the Constitution, the people can delegate power only
through the States . . . . But in McCulloch v. Maryland the Court
set forth its authoritative rejection of this idea.87
In conclusion, Kennedy declared: “[t]here can be no doubt, if we are to
respect the republican origins of the Nation and preserve its federal charac-
ter, that there exists a federal right of citizenship, a relationship between the
people of the Nation and their National Government, with which the States
may not interfere.”88
Justice Thomas, writing for the minority,89 argued that the Powell de-
cision was not controlling in the present case.90 In Powell, Congress, the
federal institution, was seeking to add to the qualifications for membership
in the House. But the Constitution limits Congress to those powers “ex-
pressly” enumerated, or by “necessary implication” accruing to the federal
government, and hence Congress lacked authority to impose new condi-
tions.91 He pointed out that in the present case, a sovereign state is in-
volved, and since the Constitution says nothing that would bar a state from
adding to the qualifications of its members to Congress, the state is free to
prescribe whatever conditions it wishes. According to Thomas, the Federal
Government and the States “face different default rules,” so that where the
Constitution is silent, the States can act but Congress cannot.92 “These basic
principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment.”93 Thomas rejected the
contention of the majority opinion that the Tenth Amendment could pre-
serve only that which the States possessed up to the adoption of that
Amendment, and the right to interfere in the qualifications or prerogatives
of members of Congress was never an element in a state’s authority. “If we
are to invalidate Arkansas’ Amendment,” said Thomas, “we must point to
something in the Federal Constitution that deprives the people of Arkansas
of the power to enact such measures.”94 To Thomas, the Court failed to do
that.
Commenting on this case, Kathleen M. Sullivan observed: “To the ma-
jority, judicial intervention is needed to protect the federal government from
the states; to the dissent, it is needed to protect the states from the federal
86. Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 840.
88. Id. at 845.
89. Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 875–77.
91. 514 U.S. at 853.
92. Id. at 848.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 850.
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government. Justice Kennedy alone would intervene to protect each side
from encroachment by the other.”95 The case is vital for illustrating how far
the conservative Justices would go in seeking to fortify state sovereignty,
and how far the liberal Justices go in preserving the national character of
the Union. As Gunther and Sullivan noted, the majority opinion by Justice
Stevens echoes Marshall’s approach in McCulloch v. Maryland, while the
dissenting opinion by Justice Thomas reflects the Antifederalist criticism of
that opinion.96
C. Dissenting New Federalists: From Raich to Obamacare
The decisions of the Court based on the New Federalism doctrine have
raised concern among some scholars that the ruling majority of justices
might be intent on revising the entire welfare program of the New Deal.97
That program, it will be recalled, was only attained after a minor judicial
revolution had taken place, beginning in 1937, and the four firmly con-
servative justices98 were replaced by more liberal ones who sanctioned the
New Deal program en masse. The medium upon which the Court relied to
approve the New Deal legislation was the Commerce Clause. So long as
Congress declared that the act in question was designed to implement the
Commerce Clause, the Court would not question its constitutionality. The
New Federalism has rejected this pattern of blind reliance on the Commerce
Clause that automatically approved every law affecting federal-state rela-
tions. These writers query whether this portends a dangerous judicial pro-
clivity to return the United States systematically to the pre-1937 era, in
which so many of the broad-based schemes instituted to accommodate the
economic and social needs of the American people in the modern age were
invalidated.
More recent decisions of the Court should allay some of these con-
cerns. One or more of the five conservative justices has sided with the erst-
while minority justices to legitimate federal action. Thus, in the case of
Gonzales v. Raich, decided in 2005, the Court ruled that under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress may criminalize the production and use of home-
grown cannabis even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes.99
95. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78, 103 (1995).
96. GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 53, at 113–14.
97. See, for example, William E. Leuchtenberg, The Tenth Amendment over Two Centuries:
More than a Truism, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 41–105 (Mark R.
Killenbeck ed., Rowan and Littlefield, 2002) and the numerous references cited therein. Conlan
and Verginiolle de Chantal sum up their position as follows: “If it is not careful, the Supreme
Court risks becoming an agent of states’ rights—a rare position in the Court’s history and one
associated with its darkest moments.” The Rehnquist Court and Contemporary American Federal-
ism, 116 No. 2 POL. SCI. Q. 275 (Summer, 2001).
98. Justices James McReynolds, George Sutherland, Willis Van Devanter, and Pierce Butler.
99. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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Federal law forbade the use of marijuana and made no exception for medi-
cal use. In a 1996 referendum, California voters legalized the medical use
of marijuana. Angel Raich used home-grown medical marijuana to relieve
the excruciating pain she suffered. Her doctor testified that without mari-
juana, her life was endangered. The marijuana that Raich grew in her gar-
den was subject to confiscation by federal agents. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals granted Raich a preliminary injunction against federal action on
the ground that she had demonstrated a strong case based on the Commerce
Clause. In the Supreme Court, Raich argued that her marijuana was not
subject to federal control since it was not in commerce, and certainly not in
interstate commerce. In a 6-3 decision, the Court invoked the 1942 Wickard
v. Filburn ruling that held that even a farmer’s consumption of the wheat he
grew on his own farm affected commerce, and it ruled that homegrown
marijuana would inevitably have an impact on the interstate market, albeit
indirectly. “In both cases,” the Court stated, “the regulation is squarely
within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity
meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial
effect on supply and demand in the national market.”100
In dissent, Justice Sandra O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, maintained that the Lopez decision governed the case, since
Raich’s use of marijuana was not within the range of interstate com-
merce.101 Moreover, she contended, the majority decision stifles innovation
by states. Federalism promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility
that, as Justice Brandeis said, “a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experi-
ments without risk to the rest of the country.”102 In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Thomas declared categorically that Raich’s cultivation and
consumption of marijuana was not “commerce . . . among the several
States,” within the meaning of the Constitution. And he warned: “If the
Federal Government can regulate growing a half-dozen cannabis plants (not
because it is interstate commerce, but because it is inextricably bound up
with interstate commerce), then Congress’ Article I powers—as expanded
by the Necessary and Proper Clause—have no meaningful limits.”103
Interestingly—indeed, surprisingly—Justice Scalia departed from the
dissenters and joined the liberal majority in sustaining the government’s
position. The present case, Scalia argued, is distinguishable from the Lopez
and Morrison decisions, which dealt with matters quite unconnected to in-
terstate commerce.104 Without regulation and control, the market for mari-
100. Id. at 19.
101. Id. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. The reference was to the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
103. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 65 (2005).
104. Id. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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juana would be open game for all. And if Congress can legislate to exclude
marijuana from the interstate market, then it is also empowered to ban such
activities which, if permitted, would affect the general scheme of regula-
tion. The Necessary and Proper Clause, Scalia contended, works in con-
junction with the Commerce Clause to enable Congress to regulate
noneconomic intrastate activities where the failure to do so “could . . . un-
dercut” its regulation of interstate commerce.105
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a sequel to the Raich
decision. Robert W. Stewart was a convicted felon who sold parts kits to
make caliber rifles that he advertised for sale. He was charged with possess-
ing firearms, most specifically machine guns, and he was sentenced to
prison for five years. He appealed on the ground that the law in question
exceeded congressional authority since the weapons he possessed were not
in interstate commerce. In United States v. Stewart,106 the Ninth Circuit
Court vacated the conviction on the ground that the relevant provision was
unconstitutional as applied. The relationship of the provision to interstate
commerce, the Appeals Court declared, was “attenuated.” The section “was
intended to keep machine guns out of the hands of criminals – an admirable
goal, but not a commercial one.”
The Supreme Court decided not to hear the case but vacated the ruling
below and directed the Ninth Circuit to reconsider Stewart in light of the
Gonzales decision. Upon reconsideration, the Appeals Court upheld the
conviction, declaring “that Congress had a rational basis for concluding
that . . . possession of homemade machineguns could substantially affect
interstate commerce in machineguns.”107
In 2010, United States v. Comstock108 illustrated starkly the willing-
ness of the Court’s majority to rely on an expansive view of the Necessary
and Proper Clause and validate a federal law in an area normally handled by
the states. The relevant Act—the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act—authorized the Attorney General of the United States to certify a per-
son who had completed his sentence in prison to be further detained in the
federal penitentiary as a mentally ill, sexually dangerous individual. The
Court held that state interests were adequately protected since the federal
government would terminate its role if requested by a state. The decision
was adopted by a 7-2 vote, with three justices who normally embraced the
New Federalism doctrine joining the majority. Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented on the ground that the law was not based on any of the enumer-
ated powers of Congress as listed in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
The majority, however, decided that the federal government, no less than a
105. Id. at 36.
106. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. 451 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
108. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
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state, was empowered to adopt and apply such a law by dint of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.
An even more surprising development was the delivery by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts of the majority opinion in the case concerning the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, known popularly as Obamacare.109 The
decision was 5-4 to uphold the federal law, and it was Roberts’ move to join
the four liberal justices (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) that
saved the health program.
The healthcare scheme was enacted by Congress in 2010 and was de-
signed to ensure a health program for some thirty million people who were
currently uninsured. There were two parts to the scheme. The first, labeled
the “Individual Mandate,” required every person to obtain health insurance
coverage. Any person not complying with this requirement would be com-
pelled to pay a penalty, to be collected by the Internal Revenue Service as
part of the person’s taxes. The second part constituted an expansion of
Medicaid. It required the states to cover individuals otherwise not included
under the program, and the extra cost was to be funded by the federal gov-
ernment. If a state refused to comply with the expansion program and ad-
minister it, the state stood to lose funding for even that part of the Medicaid
program that it had already accepted and implemented. Among those chal-
lenging the new scheme were twenty-six states that sued the federal govern-
ment claiming that Congress lacked power to impose the scheme on the
states and individuals.
In order to appreciate the legal issues in the case, which essentially
revolve around the New Federalism doctrine, it is instructive to review the
arguments of the joint dissent before addressing the reasoning of the Court.
In their joint dissenting opinion, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Al-
ito, contended that Congress exceeded its powers when it adopted the Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) requiring every person to have health insurance.
Congress can legislate only on the basis of one of the powers enumerated in
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The government argued that the law
was validated by one of two clauses in that provision—either by the inter-
state commerce power or by the tax power. But Congress, the minority
opinion said, can regulate only persons who are engaged in commerce. Per-
sons who lack an insurance policy are not engaged in commerce; by com-
pelling them to become so engaged, Congress exceeds its powers. It
attempts to create commerce, not regulate it.110
Furthermore, the dissenters denied that earlier precedents cited to sup-
port the government’s stand were applicable. In Wickard v. Filburn, failure
to plant wheat was not the issue; it was overplanting that brought the case
within the rubric of interstate commerce and subject to Congressional regu-
109. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
110. Id. at 2644–45 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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lation.111 Nor could the Necessary and Proper Clause expand the Com-
merce Clause, since in the absence of commerce, there was nothing to
expand. “If all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is
everything.”112 As for the government’s reliance on Gonzales v. Raich, it
was also misplaced, since marijuana was a subject of interstate commerce
and the prohibition in that case was essential to enforce the law effectively.
Thus, reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause was quite apt there, but
not in the present instance. The Constitution “enumerates not federally solu-
ble problems, but federally available powers.”113 In the absence of an ap-
propriate power, mandating the purchase of health insurance was thus
unconstitutional. “The proposition that the Federal Government cannot do
everything is a fundamental precept,” and Article I of the Constitution
“contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power.”114
The dissenters deemed unacceptable the alternative argument of the
government, that mandating the purchase of insurance was validated by the
tax power. According to the government, if an individual fails to secure
insurance, he must make an additional payment when he pays his taxes.
Thus, the mandate would be viewed not as “a legal command to buy insur-
ance” but rather as another tax among the many taxes that citizens pay. The
question here, according to the dissent, is not whether Congress could have
instituted the mandate by means of a tax, but whether they in fact did so.
The text of the Act refers repeatedly to the due payment as a penalty, and
although, on occasion, a severe tax has been regarded by the Court as a
penalty, never has the Court deemed a penalty “so trivial” as to be deemed a
tax. To do so in this case “is not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.”115
Moreover, the minority justices noted, defining the payment as a tax raises
another problem. Under the Anti-Injunction Act, no court can entertain a
challenge to a tax until the tax is fully paid. Thus, if it be deemed a tax, then
the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction in the first place. The response of the
government was that the payment is not a tax for purposes of the Anti-
Injunction Act, but a tax for constitutional purposes. This, in the view of the
dissenters, is a “remarkable argument . . . [t]hat carries verbal wizardry too
far, deep into the forbidden land of the sophists.”116
The second challenge to the ACA arose from the expansion of the
Medicaid program. Any state refusing to accept this expanded obligation
would forfeit all Medicaid payments from the federal government, even
those to which the state had hitherto subscribed. This threat, the respondents
maintained, was a form of coercion and beyond the powers of the federal
111. Id. at 2643.
112. Id. at 2649.
113. Id. at 2650 (emphasis in original).
114. Id. at 2647, 2650.
115. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2655.
116. Id. at 2656–57.
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government. The minority opinion explained that the spending power was
generally regarded as unlimited. Article I authorizes Congress to collect
taxes “to . . . provide for the . . . general welfare,” and although James
Madison maintained that the moneys collected could only be spent for one
of the purposes enumerated under the powers of Congress, the Court, in the
Butler case, opted for Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation that the power is
not thus restricted.117 And the Court, the minority justices conceded, has
never stamped a federal expenditure as not within the rubric of “the general
welfare.” Nevertheless, they warned:
This formidable power, if not checked in any way, would present
a grave threat to the system of federalism created by our Constitu-
tion. . . . [T]he Spending Clause gives “power to the Congress to
tear down the barriers, to invade the states’ jurisdiction, and to
become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restric-
tions save such as are self-imposed.”118 . . . While Congress may
seek to induce States to accept conditional grants, Congress may
not cross the “point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and
ceases to be inducement.”119
The Justices cited the 5-4 New York v. United States decision, which
declared that “Congress may not ‘simply commandeer the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.’”120 The mere fact that the states, as a matter of
law, are free to reject federal funds is insufficient to remove the coercive
factor. This ignores reality. “If the anti-coercion rule does not apply in this
case, then there is no such rule,” declared the dissenters.121 “The Medicaid
Expansion therefore exceeds Congress’ spending power and cannot be
implemented.”122
The minority opinion noted that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Breyer and Kagan also agreed that the section on Medicaid Expansion, as
enacted by Congress, was unconstitutional. This meant that seven members
of the Court accepted this conclusion. But the three supporters of the major-
ity opinion joined with the other two Justices in determining that the Medi-
caid Expansion could be saved by severance and emendation, so as to allow
states rejecting the expansion to retain their pre-existing Medicaid funds.
The dissent rejected this attempt to save the provision. It amounted to re-
writing the provision—a task that was legislative, not judicial. Since both
pillars of the Act, the Individual Mandate and the Medicaid Expansion,
117. Id. at 2599 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
118. Id. at 2659 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 78).
119. Id. (quoting Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
120. Id. at 2660 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)).
121. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2662.
122. Id. at 2666.
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were central to the Act, and since both were unconstitutional, the Act must,
according to the dissent, be invalidated “in its entirety.”123
Scathingly dismissing the Court’s approach, the minority opinion
declared:
The Court today decides to save a statute Congress did not write.
It rules that what the statute declares to be a requirement with a
penalty is instead an option subject to a tax. And it changes the
intentionally coercive sanction of a total cut-off of Medicaid
funds to a supposedly noncoercive cut-off of only the incremental
funds that the Act makes available.124
In conclusion, the dissenting justices set forth their jurisprudential approach
to the federal equation:
The values that should have determined our course today are cau-
tion, minimalism, and the understanding that the Federal Govern-
ment is one of limited powers. . . . Structural protections—
notably, the restraints imposed by federalism and separation of
powers—tend to be undervalued or even forgotten by our citi-
zens. . . . It should be the responsibility of the Court to teach
otherwise, to remind our people that the Framers considered
structural protections of freedom the most important ones, for
which reason they alone were embodied in the original Constitu-
tion. . . . The fragmentation of power produced by the structure of
our Government is central to liberty, and when we destroy it, we
place liberty at peril. Today’s decision should have . . . taught this
truth; instead our judgment today has disregarded it.125
In the decision of the Court upholding (in the main) the Obamacare
law, Chief Justice Roberts addressed and attempted to refute each of the
arguments of the joint dissent.
Under the U.S. system of government, he averred, the National Gov-
ernment possesses only limited powers, with the States and the People re-
taining the remainder. Although federal power has expanded dramatically, a
law can be sustained only if there is a demonstrable constitutional basis for
its adoption. Citing the decision in New York v. United States, he stressed
that under the American system, “state sovereignty is not just an end in
itself: Rather federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power.”126 “By denying any one government com-
plete jurisdiction over all concerns of public life, federalism protects the
liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”127
123. Id. at 2677.
124. Id. at 2676.
125. Id. at 2677.
126. Id. at 2578 (citing New York, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).
127. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2758 (citing Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011)).
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Before proceeding to the merits Roberts adverted to the Anti-Injunc-
tion Act that requires that anyone suing the U.S. government in a tax matter
must first pay the tax before the court will entertain the suit. But in the
present case, the Chief Justice contended, the payment due is labeled a
“penalty,” not a tax; hence, the Anti-Injunction Act does not operate to bar
the Court from hearing and adjudicating the merits of the issue.128
Of the two clauses cited by the government to justify Obamacare—the
Commerce Clause and the tax power—only the tax power, in Roberts’
view, furnished a valid basis. As far as the commerce power is concerned,
“Congress has never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals
not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”129 “The Fram-
ers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it.”130
The Chief Justice concluded: “The individual mandate forces individuals
into commerce precisely because they elected to refrain from commercial
activity. Such a law cannot be sustained under a clause authorizing Con-
gress to ‘regulate Commerce.’”131
Nor could the law be upheld by means of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. The government had argued that the mandate was an “integral part
of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation” and therefore em-
braced inactivity as much as activity to be effective. But in order to em-
brace anything, Roberts asserted, it was necessary to point to a granted
power from which the Necessary and Proper Clause derives its authority. In
the absence of the applicability of the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and
Proper Clause could not be expanded to include inactivity.132
On the other hand, the alternative argument, that the required payment
in the event of non-purchase of insurance can be deemed a tax, offered,
according to Roberts, a suitable basis for validating the mandate. The man-
date, he argued, is not a legal command to buy insurance; it simply makes
non-purchase of insurance a state of affairs upon which the government
imposes a tax, just as in the purchase of gasoline or any other item. True,
the law describes the due payment as a penalty, rendering the Anti-Injunc-
tion requirement inapplicable; yet, the character of the exaction remains that
of a tax. It is the Internal Revenue Service that collects the payment. Non-
payment is not classified as a crime, and the sole obligation imposed on
those who elect not to purchase insurance is payment of the prescribed fee.
These features stamp the payment as a tax for purposes of constitutionality.
Nor is it a direct tax that must be apportioned among the several states since
it is not a capitation tax nor a tax on land. While the federal government
cannot command people to obtain insurance, it can tax a person who lacks
128. Id. at 2580.
129. Id. at 2586.
130. Id. at 2589.
131. Id. at 2591.
132. Id. at 2592–93.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-JAN-16 12:30
2015] NEW FEDERALISM IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 199
insurance. Thus, as a federal tax, rather than as a penalty for not purchasing
insurance, the Affordable Care Act can be upheld as valid and
constitutional.133
In considering whether the Medicaid expansion section of the Act can
be upheld, the key issue, said Roberts, was to see if the federal govern-
ment’s use of the spending clause of the Constitution was designed, in this
instance, to encourage the states to join in the expansion program or to
compel them to do so. If the latter, then the law undermines “the status of
the States as independent sovereigns” in the American federal system of
government.134 “The two-government system established by the Framers
would give way to a system that vests power in one central government,
and individual liberty would suffer.”135 It was in recognition of this princi-
ple that the Court had struck down federal legislation that sought to com-
mandeer a state’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal
purposes, such as in the Printz136 and New York137 cases.
In the present case, “the financial ‘inducement’” Congress has chosen
by which to implement the expansion of Medicaid “is much more than ‘rel-
atively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”138 A state refusing to
undertake the expansion of the Medicaid program stands to lose federal
financing even for the earlier part of the Medicaid program that it had ad-
ministered hitherto. This was coercion. Congress, said Roberts, was not free
to penalize states that chose not to participate in the new program “by tak-
ing away their existing Medicaid funding.”139
In sum, the government could not withdraw existing Medicaid funds
for failure to join in the expansion program. By eliminating this unconstitu-
tional feature in the Affordable Care Act, the rest of the Act is in full con-
formity with constitutional requirements, and the expanded program of
Medicaid can go forward without hindrance. The Chief Justice dismissed
the contention of the dissent that this amounted to rewriting the provision.
Preserving the Act while declaring one feature unconstitutional and sever-
ing it from the rest of the law was not rewriting; it was merely fulfilling the
wish of Congress to the extent possible, and fully in accordance with the
Constitution.140
Justice Ginsburg, in a separate opinion, took issue with the minority
opinion and also with part of the opinion of the Chief Justice.141 She en-
dorsed the Chief Justice’s contention that the tax power validates the mini-
133. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
134. Id. at 2602.
135. Id.
136. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
137. New York, 505 U.S. at 174–75.
138. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
139. Id. at 2607.
140. Id. at 2608.
141. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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mum coverage provision, namely the individual mandate. But in her view,
that provision was also validated by the Commerce Clause. Additionally,
she dissented from Roberts’ view on the Medicaid Expansion and held that
it was fully constitutional under the spending power. In short, she consid-
ered that national power was adequate to sustain the entire Obamacare
program.
Justice Ginsburg noted that the provision of health care is today “a
concern of national dimension just as the provision of old-age and survi-
vors’ benefits was in the 1930s.”142 She cited cases from the New Deal era
to demonstrate that since then, the Court has legitimated Congress’ author-
ity “to set the nation’s course in the economic and social welfare realm.”143
Given congressional prerogative, Ginsburg argued, the federal pro-
gram should be recognized as a fit constitutional measure to redress this
national problem of health care. She cited letters from James Madison and
George Washington in advance of the 1787 Constitutional Convention that
confirmed that the purpose of the Convention was to create a national gov-
ernment that would be qualified to resolve national problems, untrammeled
by state interference.144 “Hindering Congress’ ability to [adapt to changing
economic and financial realities] is shortsighted; if history is any guide,”
Ginsburg predicted, “today’s constriction of the Commerce Clause will not
endure.”145
Justice Sotomayor accepted Justice Ginsburg’s opinion totally, while
Justices Breyer and Kagan endorsed her stand on the relevance of the Com-
merce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Implicitly, all four of
the Justices spurned the tenets of the New Federalism.
D. Summary: The New Federalism
In reviewing the cases that establish the New Federalism doctrine for-
mulated by the conservative majority in the Supreme Court, it becomes
clear that the doctrine comprises several propositions:
1. The states are sovereign. In fact, their sovereignty preceded
that of the Union, and consequently, it must be respected and
preserved. The national government must accord the states
due dignity.
2. As a result, a state enjoys sovereign immunity from suit, un-
less it consents or its immunity is validly abrogated.
3. The federal government cannot commandeer the states, or
their employees, to act as agents for federal programs, unless
the state consents or its immunity is validly abrogated.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2615.
145. Id. at 2625.
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4. The interstate Commerce Clause cannot be used to enact na-
tional laws binding on the states unless the subject genuinely
relates to commerce and has an interstate character.
5. In fields in which the Constitution is silent, the states are at
liberty to legislate, whereas the federal government is pre-
cluded from acting in the absence of a defined or implied
power.
The New Federalism doctrine is premised on the Originalist school of
constitutional interpretation, and it is contended that the doctrine reflects the
Framers’ true federal design. But are these premises historically sustaina-
ble? To illuminate the historical record, several aspects of the Founding,
often referenced in the current debate on the New Federalism, warrant par-
ticular attention and re-examination. These include:
• The aims of those who promoted the convening of a constitu-
tional convention.
• The crucial modifications of the original plan that were intro-
duced at Philadelphia and the factors that prompted their
adoption.
• The process by which the enumeration and definition of con-
gressional powers came to be included in the Constitution.
• The introduction of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and its
effect on the federal character of the Constitution.
• The role of the ratification debates in delimiting the contours
of the federal arrangements.
• The meaning of the Tenth Amendment and its impact on the
federal balance.
Hovering over the analysis of all these issues is a fundamental, oft-ne-
glected, primary question regarding the historical sources that are to be
given pride of place as most relevant to the discussion.
II. THE NEW FEDERALISM: ANALYSIS
A. The Framers’ Constitution: Creating a Nation
The aim of the Founding Fathers who drafted the Constitution in 1787
was to create a nation out of the thirteen states composing the United
States.146 As George Washington said in advance of the Philadelphia Con-
vention: “I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation, without having
146. The colonial antecedents of American federalism are traced by Alison L. LaCroix in her
book, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (Harvard Univ. Press 2010). Gordon
Wood critically examined the work in a major review, Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 UNIV.
OF CHIC. L. REV. 705–32, to which LaCroix responded in Rhetoric and Reality in Early American
Legal History, id. at 733–58. My analysis differs in vital respects from the approach of both of
these writers. It also differs essentially from that of John C. Yoo, Federalism and Judicial Review,
in MARK R. KILLENBECK, THE TENTH AMENDMENT, 131–79 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). For a
perspective closer to the one presented in this paper, see Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1993–94).
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lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in as ener-
getic a manner, as the authority of the different state governments extends
over the several States.”147 James Madison, in a letter to Edmund Randolph
dated April 8, 1787, wrote: “Let the national Government be armed with a
positive & complete authority in all cases where uniform measures are nec-
essary. As in trade &c. &c.”148 In calling for a convention to be held in
Philadelphia, the Confederation Congress described its purpose to be “es-
tablishing in these states a firm national government.” “The federal consti-
tution,” the resolution said, should be “adequate to the exigencies of
government & the preservation of the union.”149 Justice Sandra O’Connor
has summed it up as follows: “The Framers of our Constitution intended
Congress to have sufficient power to address national problems.”150
To recall briefly: When the Constitutional Convention assembled at
Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, the states were anything but united.
The centrifugal forces operating among the member states were tearing the
Union apart, and there was a common belief that three or more regional
republics would be formed out of the general mass. The Articles of Confed-
eration had proven themselves totally inadequate to facilitate the adminis-
tration of a national body of thirteen autonomous units. Dedicated and far-
sighted individuals recognized that the creation of an effective system of
national government for the United States demanded the total abandonment
of the underlying principles of the Articles that declared, in Article II, that
each state retained its “sovereignty, freedom and independence,”151 and the
formulation in its place of an entirely new document of government that
would bind the states into one united national polity. Those sponsoring the
holding of a convention—most prominently, Madison and Hamilton—
clearly sought to establish a powerful central government that would com-
pletely dominate the states. This is reflected in their writings in advance of
the Convention, and specifically, in the Virginia Plan. Drafted largely by
Madison, the Virginia Plan provided in Article 6 that the national legisla-
ture would be empowered 1) to enjoy the legislative rights vested in the
Confederation Congress; 2) to legislate wherever the separate states are in-
competent or where the harmony of the United States would be affected by
separate state legislation; 3) to veto all laws of the states contravening in the
opinion of the national legislature the articles of union or any treaties; and
147. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786), in 4 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 212–13 (W. W. Abbot ed., Univ. Press of Virginia, 1995).
148. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (April 8, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 370 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., Univ. of Chicago Press,
1975).
149. CHARLES C. TANSILL, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF
THE AMERICAN STATES 46 (House Doc. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.) (1926).
150. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J.
dissenting).
151. TANSILL, supra note 149, at 27.
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4) “to call forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union
failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.”152
Under this scheme, the central government would obviously exercise
control over the states to an extraordinary degree. As Bernard Bailyn ob-
served: “The goal of the initiators of change was the creation . . . of national
power – the construction of . . . a Machtstaat, a central national power that
involved armed force, the aggressive management of international relations,
and, potentially at least, the regulation of vital aspects of everyday life by a
government dominant over all other, lesser governments.”153 It may be hard
to believe that Madison, Hamilton, Randolph, et al. really thought that they
could succeed in pushing such a radical plan through the Convention and
expect it to be ratified by state conventions. But in fact, the original text of
Article 6 of the Virginia Plan was endorsed by the Convention at least three
times, with only the last paragraph, on the use of force against a delinquent
state, eliminated.154 As Madison said: “The use of force agst. a State would
look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment.”155
He dismissed the possibility of coercing a larger state.156
No effective opposition arose to this comprehensive scheme for na-
tional subordination of the states. The few isolated voices that objected
soon found themselves so lost in the shuffle that they left the Conference
and headed home.157 One or two critics did remain, but their voices were
muted in the consensus that emerged for a strong central government freed
from the shackles of the states.158
B. The Birth of Federalism: The Role of the Smaller and Slave States
Creation of such a powerful central authority, however, aroused fears
among the representatives of the smaller states. After the Revolution, when
the Articles of Confederation were being drafted, they had demanded an
equal vote in the Continental Congress for each state, regardless of size and
wealth; and now, in Philadelphia, they demanded that the new regime be
based on the same formula so that they would not be swallowed up by the
larger states.159 Their objections, it should be noted, did not relate to the
152. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 20–23 (Max Farrand ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND RECORDS].
153. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 325
(Harvard Univ. Press enlarged ed.1992).
154. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 225.
155. Id. at 54.
156. Id. at 327.
157. Of the three New York delegates, Robert Yates and John Lansing left the Convention on
July 10. Their report to the governor of New York is recorded in 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note
152, at 244–47. Alexander Hamilton, the third delegate, remained at the Convention.
158. The major dissenter who remained at the Convention was Luther Martin of Maryland.
159. See the comment of Gunning Bedford of Delaware: “I do not, gentlemen, trust you . . .
The small states never can agree to the Virginia plan.” Id. at 1:500–501 (emphasis in original).
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sovereignty or independence of the states—indeed, “states’ righters” were
nowhere to be seen or heard at Philadelphia. What motivated the smaller
states’ delegates was the demand for equality. They even proclaimed them-
selves prepared to see the present division of states abolished, so long as a
new division would ensure each state equal size with the other states.160
Once the principle of equality in the Senate was firmly secured, the
smaller states could be enlisted in the grand design of the Federalists. In
fact, their delegates became quite enthusiastic about enhancing the power of
the national government in relation to the states. Thus, Gunning Bedford of
Delaware moved to add to the heads of power in Article 6 an all-embracing
formula that would permit Congress “to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union.” His proposal was promptly adopted.161 As Charles
Pinckney predicted, very early in the Convention: “The whole comes to
this . . . Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples and
concur in the Natil. [sic] system.”162
But the composition of the national legislature was not the only issue
that engaged the smaller states; they also demanded a say in the process for
selecting a Chief Executive. They therefore rejected a popular vote for
choosing a President since this would nullify the advantage they had gained
in securing state equality in the upper house of the national legislature. And
in this quest they were aided by the slave states that were intent on preserv-
ing the advantage they had secured in the lower house by means of the
three-fifths rule.163 The outcome was the Electoral College, which was but
a mirror image of the real Congress, with the respective increments in Con-
gress preserved. It was a one-time congress for the exclusive purpose of
selecting a President.164
Thus two groups, the small and the slave states, attained a significant
role for themselves within key national institutions of government—the leg-
islature and the executive. But whereas the small states were now national-
minded and content with the broad formula of federal heads of power,165
160. See a preliminary sketch of the New Jersey Plan, id. at 3:613; and remarks of Brearley,
id. at 1:177.
161. Id. at 2:26–27. Coming from Bedford, the proposal was quite surprising, since he had
warned the larger states that if they did not concede, the smaller states “will find some foreign ally
of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice.” Id. at 1:492.
His remark was severely criticized, and he apologized and said he had been misunderstood. Id. at
530.
162. Id. at 255.
163. Under the three-fifths rule, a state’s representation in the lower house would be increased
by three fifths of its slave population. Slaves, of course, did not vote, but the white electorate
enjoyed this increment in its representation in Congress.
164. See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 JOURNAL OF AM. HIS. 35, 35–58 (1986).
165. See the comment of Charles Warren citing George Bancroft: With the adoption of the
Connecticut Compromise, the smaller states, “so I received it from the lips of Madison, and so it
appears from the records – exceeded all others in zeal for granting powers to the General Govern-
ment.” CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 309 (Little, Brown, 1928).
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the slave states were anything but pleased. Would such plenary legislative
power enable the national government to interfere with, or even seek to
abolish, slavery?166 Butler and Rutledge, both from South Carolina, repeat-
edly questioned the need for such broad grants of power as provided for in
draft Article 6. Butler was quite blunt in expressing his concern: “Property
in slaves should not be exposed to danger under a Govt. instituted for the
protection of property.”167 “The security the Southn. States want is that
their negroes may not be taken from them, which some gentlemen within or
without doors, have a very good mind to do.”168 Fellow South Carolinian,
General Cotesworth Pinckney, was no less blunt. He “reminded the Con-
vention that if the Committee [of Detail] should fail to insert some security
to the Southern States agst. an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports,
he shd. be bound by duty to his State to vote agst, their Report.”169
The smaller states had served as the spearhead of the demand for
equality in one of the two houses of the legislature; but the battle for limit-
ing congressional authority was that of the slave states alone. Their dele-
gates insisted on having Article 6 include an enumerated, detailed list of
powers that Congress would dispose of. It is also noteworthy that when the
draft provisions were being prepared for assignment to the Committee of
Detail for formulation in a draft constitution, Rutledge of South Carolina
moved for “a specification of the powers comprised in the general terms” of
Article 6.170 The vote was 5-5, and thus failed.171 All the smaller states,
except for Connecticut, were opposed, while all of the southern states, with
the exception of North Carolina, voted in favor of enumeration. The divi-
sion says much about the motives of those sponsoring the delimitation of
federal power. The smaller states were content to preserve the pristine
formula of the Virginia Plan for heads of power, while the southern states,
concerned about the security of slavery, desired a more precise definition
than the Virginia version.
As it turned out, the five-man Committee of Detail172 was composed
of delegates, a majority of whom had voiced objections to the heads of
power formula assigned to Congress. Rutledge was chairman, and he was
166. Akhill Reed Amar succinctly summarizes the concern of the slave states regarding the
threat of abolition. AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 113–14 (Random House 2005). Kil-
lenbeck, in his volume on McCulloch v. Maryland, points out that the decision aroused fears in the
south that the federal government might now believe that it had judicial imprimatur to possibly
limit or ban slavery altogether. At the time the decision was handed down, discussions were going
on that led to the Missouri Compromise. MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, SECURING A NATION, 142,
146, 156–57 (Univ. Press of Kansas, 2006).
167. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 594.
168. Id. at 605.
169. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 95.
170. Id. at 17.
171. Id.
172. For records of the vote on the formation of the Committee, see 2 FARRAND RECORDS,
supra note 152, at 85, 97, 106.
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joined by James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who had argued for a precise defi-
nition of national powers so as to avoid clashes with state authorities, and
John Randolph of Virginia, who held similar views. The final two were
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, a foremost proponent of the New Jersey
Plan, and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. Little wonder that one of the
first acts of the Committee was a draft enumeration of specific powers in
place of the heads of power of Article 6.173 Southern fears had won out
where small state concern was negligible or even non-existent.174
Curiously, the events enumerated above relating to the origins of fed-
eralism in the Constitution have gone largely unnoticed in the literature.
The importance of this development—the creation of a federal government
of limited powers—cannot be underestimated. One writer, however, has
charged that the five members of the Committee of Detail totally trans-
formed the Convention’s resolutions to produce a much more weakened
national government than was intended by the Convention plenary. John C.
Hueston, in a Note that appeared in the Yale Law Journal,175 condemns the
conduct of the Committee as a usurpation of the plenary will. He writes:
“This note suggests that rather than simply elaborating upon the existing
resolutions, the Committee actually redefined the constitutional balance of
state and federal powers by enhancing the rights of states at the expense of
sweeping central powers.”176 According to Hueston, scholars and Judges
should recognize that the Committee’s version was “second choice” and
“should redefine” the intent of the Convention accordingly.177 Strangely, in
making his charge, Hueston omits to link the issue to the slavery question.
In an article that I published in 2000,178 I discounted Hueston’s con-
spiratorial interpretation of the work of the Committee of Detail, primarily
for one reason: when the Committee submitted its report to the Convention,
there was not even a murmur of protest about the change that had replaced
heads of power with defined and enumerated powers. According to this
assessment, the delegates were apparently satisfied that the change helped
prevent clashes between the central and state governments. Undoubtedly,
this was a factor with some delegates.179 But upon closer reading of the
173. See id. at 142–46.
174. Obviously, Rutledge and company did not believe that the Necessary and Proper Clause
would pose a threat to the preservation of slavery. In fact, Charles Warren attributes the inclusion
of that Clause in the Constitution to Rutledge. See WARREN, supra note 165, at 486–87.
175. John C. Hueston, Note, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The Role
of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.
J.] 765, 765–83 (1990).
176. Id. at 766.
177. Id. at 783.
178. See Shlomo Slonim, Securing States’ Interests at the 1787 Constitutional Convention: A
Reassessment, 14 STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1, 7 n.14. (2000).
179. See, for instance, comment of James Wilson, 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at
363, and of Nathaniel Gorham for “precise and explicit” definition of federal powers. 2 FARRAND
RECORDS, supra note 152, at 17.
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Minutes, it becomes clear, that the prime consideration for enumeration was
the demand of the slave states to ensure that the federal government not be
empowered to interfere with the system of slavery. Rutledge of South Caro-
lina was chairman of the Committee of Detail, and from the earliest days of
the Convention, he kept calling for an enumeration of powers.180 With a
committee sympathetic to his concern, he was able to ram this through and
present it to the Convention as a fait accompli. Thus, the reason for the
silence of the delegates was apparently because they recognized that this
was a vital plank in the pro-slavery program and no one was prepared to
oppose it, just as they did not oppose other elements in that program. The
scheme for an all-powerful national government was revised to eclipse the
scope and number of federal powers in order to accommodate the slave
states.181 It was, perhaps, the most significant concession that these states
managed to wring out of the Convention.182
Given this historical background, the suggestion that federalism, like
the separation of powers principle, was instituted by the Framers to pre-
clude tyranny, is unsubstantiated. The thesis only emerged belatedly, in the
struggle to secure ratification of the Constitution. And no one knew this
better than James Madison.
C. The Court and the Revival of Dual Federalism
In Federalist No. 51, Madison wrote:
In the compound republic of America, the powers surrendered by
the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will controul each other;
at the same time that each will be controuled by itself.
It is not clear whether Madison is claiming that the federal division of
government was actually designed by the Convention to safeguard liberty
and rights, or whether he is simply analyzing, ex post facto, the situation
that emerged from the large state-small state controversy and produced two
180. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 53.
181. In listing the concessions that the slave states extracted from the northern states, Paul
Finkelman notes that “Congress’s powers were limited and could never reach the slaveowner.”
The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 349, 381 (1989). He cites the statement of General Pinckney at the South Carolina ratify-
ing convention: “We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them, for
no such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on all hands, that general government has no
powers but what are expressly granted by the Constitution, and that all rights not expressed were
reserved by the several states.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
182. Several historians, including Jack Rakove, Michael Zuckert, and the late Lance Banning,
contend that from the outset, the Convention delegates intended to replace the open-ended formula
of the Virginia Plan with a defined list of powers. In my article, Securing State Interests at the
1787 Constitutional Convention, I cited Madison’s comments both during and after the Conven-
tion to refute this claim. Slonim, supra note 178, at 6 n.44.
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governments exercising concurrent authority over each section of the coun-
try. Regardless of Madison’s intention in this passage of the Federalist Pa-
pers, the members of the bench who have espoused the doctrine of New
Federalism have seized upon Madison’s analysis of federalism to posit their
thesis that the Constitution endorses the principle of dual federalism, under
which the states enjoy genuine sovereignty. The following quotations illus-
trate this line of argument:
1. “As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a
system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Fed-
eral Government . . . . ‘The constitutionally mandated bal-
ance of power between the States and the Federal
Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the pro-
tection of our fundamental liberties.’”183
2. “Just as surely as the Framers envisioned a National Govern-
ment capable of solving national problems, they also envi-
sioned a republic whose vitality was assured by the diffusion
of power not only among the branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, but also between the Federal Government and the
States . . . . We would do well to recall the constitutional
basis for federalism.”184
3. “[F]ederalism was the unique contribution of the Framers to
political science and political theory. Though on the surface
the idea may seem counter-intuitive, it was the insight of the
Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation of two
governments, not one.”185
4. “As we have repeatedly noted, the Framers crafted the federal
system of government so that the people’s rights would be
secured by the division of power.”186
This diffusion-of-powers thesis is difficult to accept as an explanation
for the origins of federalism for two reasons: first, because of the sources
cited as the basis of the thesis, and second, because of the manner and shape
in which federalism was, in fact, framed at the Constitutional Convention.
Regarding the source of the thesis, the primary, if not the sole, refer-
ence appears to be the Federalist Papers, and especially No. 51, authored
183. Justice Sandra O’Connor in the majority opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
457–59 (1991) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metr. Transit Auth, 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985)
(Powell, J., dissenting)) (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 51, 45 (James Madison), No. 28 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
184. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581–82, (1985) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting). See also Justice O’Connor’s opinion in New York, 505 U.S. at 182 (citing FEDER-
ALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
185. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J. & O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (citing FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison)).
186. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 n. 7 (2000) (Rehnquist, J., majority). See
also the views of Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia on the constitutional
design of federalism, as reflected in their respective majority and dissenting opinions in the Sebe-
lius case, discussed above.
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by James Madison, and No. 22 or No. 28, written by Alexander Hamil-
ton.187 This reliance on the Federalist Papers is rather strange. The Papers
were, after all, a propaganda tract written subsequent to the Constitutional
Convention to persuade New Yorkers of the benefits of the Constitution,
and most particularly, the document’s superiority over the Articles of Con-
federation, which it was intended to replace. As Bernard Bailyn has noted,
the Federalist Papers were written “polemically, to help win a political
battle.”188 Even Madison frankly admitted: “It cannot be denied without
forgetting what belongs to human nature, that in consulting the contempo-
rary writings, which vindicated and recommended the Constitution, it is fair
to keep in mind that the authors might be sometimes influenced by the zeal
of advocates.”189 Paul Rahe sums it up neatly: “Despite its lasting fame,
The Federalist is less a treatise in political philosophy composed for the
ages than a work of political rhetoric aimed at a particular audience.”190
Ostensibly, Originalism is the leitmotif of the Supreme Court majority
that enunciated the New Federalism doctrine,191 and one might have ex-
pected that The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, as so conve-
niently edited in 1911 by Max Farrand, would serve as the primary source
referenced in the Court’s opinions. Yet over the years, the courts have made
so much use of the Federalist Papers in interpreting the Constitution that
by 2010, the Federalist Papers had been cited by the Supreme Court in
187. H. Jefferson Powell points to an additional line of argument that Justice O’Connor
presents for disqualifying congressional acts. The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA.
L. REV. 633, 646 (1993). Justice O’Connor cites the famous passage enunciated by Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland: “Let the end be legitimate,” etc., which concludes with the phrase, all
means that are consistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution” are constitutional. Id.
(citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)). It is O’Connor’s contention
that federal acts that fail to dignify state sovereignty are not in accordance with the “spirit” of the
Constitution as reflected in the Tenth Amendment and are therefore unconstitutional. As Powell
points out, Marshall was discussing the doctrine of implied powers and his reference to “the spirit
of the Constitution” would have no bearing on a statute implementing an enumerated power. Id.
Besides, reference to the spirit of the Constitution would convert the New Federalism into a very
subjective medium, lacking any clear source in the text of the Constitution. Above all, the refer-
ence to the Tenth Amendment as a basis for the spirit of the Constitution is misplaced, as noted
below.
188. BAILYN, supra note 153, at 328–29 n.12. See also BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE
WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 103 (2003). In Chap-
ter IV, Bailyn offers an illuminating analysis of the historical importance of the Federalist. None-
theless, he acknowledges that “the Federalist papers were polemical essays directed to specific
institutional proposals written in the heat of a fierce political battle.” Id. at 103.
189. 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 463 (letter to Edward Livingston dated Apr. 17,
1824).
190. PAUL A. RAHE, REPUBLICS ANCIENT AND MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 573 (North Carolina Press 1992).
191. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS L. REV.,
693–706 (1976); see also Antonin Scalia, Constitutional Interpretation the Old Fashioned Way,
Address at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.bc.edu/content/
dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/Symposia/Symposia%202010-2011/Constitutional_Interpretation_
Scalia.pdf.
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innumerable cases.192 So long as Madison’s minutes were not available and
there was no other source to interpret the Constitution, there was little alter-
native to the Federalist Papers. But after 1836, when the full record of
Madison’s minutes at the Constitutional Convention appeared, the Papers
should logically have been regarded as, at most, a secondary source.193
Even Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, felt compelled to
say: “[T]he opinions expressed by the authors of that work [the Federalist]
have been justly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding the
Constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which exceeds their merit; but
in applying their opinions to the cases which may arise in the progress of
our government, a right to judge of their correctness must be retained[.]”194
Constitutional interpretation, it is well recognized, is a complex sub-
ject, and there are numerous schools of thought on how to approach the
matter. The literature on the topic is vast. But no one can deny that a con-
temporaneous account of the formulation of a provision should, at least for
Originalists, be a proper starting point, and a valuable and prime source for
understanding the purpose that the provision was intended to serve.
Undoubtedly, the much-quoted remarks of Madison and Hamilton in
the Federalist Papers reflect the ability of both men to adapt themselves to
new realities and convert into a virtue an arrangement that both of them had
fought tooth and nail to prevent. Both had striven to institute a unitary sys-
tem of government that would ride roughshod over the states. After the
Constitutional Convention issued the completed document and while he
was smarting from the defeat he had suffered by the Convention’s rejection
of his pet project of a national legislative veto over state legislation,
Madison informed Jefferson that, in his estimation, the Constitution was a
failure.195 Hamilton, likewise, indicated that the Constitution was far re-
192. See BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW, supra note 188, at 127–28.
193. For a comprehensive and excellent scheme for rating the various sources for interpreting
the Constitution, see Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L. J. 1113 (2003). In their view, Farrand’s
Records should be recognized as an “invaluable . . . source of constitutional meaning . . . of
persuasive but not authoritative value.” Id. at 1214. They dismiss the claim that the secret nature
of the 1787 Convention is reason for discounting the Records. The Federalist Papers, and the
writings of the Antifederalists, as also the record of the state ratifying conventions, are “good
extratextual sources of constitutional meaning” but not “the incontrovertibly ‘best’ extratextual
sources of meaning.” Id. at 1158–59.
194. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 433 (1819).
195. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1787), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 102–104 (Julian P. Boyd ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1955), http://foun-
ders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-12-02-0095 (“I hazard an opinion . . . that the plan
should it be adopted will neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local mis-
chiefs which every where excite disgusts against the state governments.”) (emphasis in original).
See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 24, 1787) in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 205-220 (expounding on the reasons for seeing the constitution as a failure).
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moved from the instrument of government he desired.196 In the aftermath of
the drafting process, however, both men settled for the good in the absence
of the best and trumpeted the federal system as a grand scheme for reining
in tyrannous rule and protecting the rights of the people. But the Federalist
Papers can hardly serve as evidence of what transpired in Constitution Hall
in Philadelphia. For that we must turn to Farrand,197 from which it emerges
clearly that, as noted, federalism was not instituted to diffuse power, elegant
and enticing as the political theory sounds. Nor was it introduced into the
Constitution to satisfy the demands of “states’ righters,” since, as noted
earlier, they carried no weight. The smaller states demanded equality, and
there could be no equality unless the states were to survive as political enti-
ties endowed with a measure of sovereignty and independence; and the
slave states joined the fray in their anxiety to protect slavery.
There appears to be one reference in the Records to something ap-
proaching the diffusion thesis, but it focuses on state authority as a factor
for stability in addition to state representation in the national government.
Very early in the Convention (June 2), discussion arose about the correct
procedure for removing a corrupt executive. John Dickinson of Delaware
proposed that he be removed by the national legislature upon the request of
a majority of state legislatures.198 He believed that a limited monarchy, as
in England, was perhaps the best system of government. Given that the
British system was inappropriate for the United States, “we must look out
for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Leg-
islature [with equal representation for the states in one of the two Houses.]”
The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal
source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and con-
siderable powers to be left with the States. He considered “the accidental
lucky division of this country into distinct States” a fit means of preserving
the republic, and opposed those intent on abolishing this division. In other
words, Dickinson was not claiming that the federal design of the Constitu-
196. See 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 645–46 (presenting Hamilton’s remarks on
the final day of the Philadelphia Convention).
197. Farrand’s Records are essentially based on Madison’s minutes as he recorded them day-
to-day at the Constitutional Convention. See id. Some have raised questions regarding the reliabil-
ity of Madison’s notes, since he may have been prejudiced in recording the debates, and may even
have doctored the minutes subsequently. See James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution:
The Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 1–39 (1986); see also Frank B.
Cross, The Practical Meaning of Originalism, in Selected Works of Frank B. Cross 27–30 (2012),
http://works.bepress.com/frank_cross/; and Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 193, at 1191–96. But
with regard to the issue of federalism, we also have the minutes of noted Antifederalist Robert
Yates who was present at the Convention at least through the presentation of the Connecticut
Compromise to the plenary on July 5th. Hutson, supra note 197, at 2. Since Yates’ notes for this
period substantially corroborate Madison’s minutes throughout, there is little reason to doubt the
veracity of Madison’s record, certainly with regard to the factors that led to the introduction of
federalism into the Constitution.
198. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 85–87.
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tion was created and instituted to diffuse power, but that the chance division
of states would help ensure stability.
In short, federalism, according to Dickinson, was a fortuitous conse-
quence of the need for a central government to unite thirteen colonies and
exercise national authority. Federalism was not created by the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention; it was a state of affairs that they had to con-
tend with. Dickinson saw merit in this circumstance, others condemned it,
but no one claimed title. Dickinson’s comment represents a valuable insight
into the origins of the federal system. No other delegate touched on this
point.199
At various junctures in the Convention debates, the mind-set of the
delegates with respect to the federal design comes to the fore. Thus, in
arguing the case for the New Jersey Plan that he had presented to the ple-
num, Paterson said: “A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members
composing it & sovereignty supposes equality”; otherwise, he said, “there is
an end to liberty.”200 And Dickinson’s stand on state equality in the Senate
is reflected in his proposal that the members of the Senate be appointed by
the state legislatures in order “that the mind & body of the State as such
shd. be represented in the national Legislature.”201 George Mason, although
a representative of a large state, recognized small state demands:
[W]hatever power may be necessary for the Natl. Govt. a certain
portion must necessarily be left in the States. . . . The State Legis-
latures also ought to have some means of defending themselves
agst. encroachments of the Natl. Govt. . . . [W]hat better means
can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather to
make them a constituent part of the Natl. Establishment.202
General Pinckney of South Carolina “was for making the States as much as
could be conveniently done a part of the Genl. Gov’t.”203
As noted earlier, the demand of the smaller states for a federal system
was expressed in seeking equal representation in the national institutions of
government—legislative and executive. State representation in the Electoral
College was weighted in favor of the smaller states (and the slave states),
the choice of delegates was left to the state legislatures, and if the College
failed to choose a President, the choice out of the top five candidates was
transferred to the House of Representatives voting as states. When it was
suggested to limit the House choice to the top three, rather than the top five,
199. His proposal for the removal of an executive on application by state legislatures was
rejected. Id. at 86–87. At the same time, however, Dickinson endorsed the national legislative veto
over state legislation sponsored by Pinckney and Madison as a means of preventing “discord”
between the states and the national government. Id. at 167. Obviously, for Dickinson, preserving
the states did not entail endowing them with absolute sovereignty.
200. Id. at 178, 183.
201. Id. at 158.
202. Id. at 155–56.
203. Id. at 429.
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thereby restricting the chance of the smaller states occasionally landing a
President, Roger Sherman of Connecticut said he “would sooner give up the
plan,” and the choice out of five was retained.204 Similar impulses explain
why treaties and appointments, dependent on the initiative of the President,
were subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, the one body repre-
senting the states where the smaller states had disproportionate influence. In
sum, contrary to the New Federalism thesis enunciated above, federalism
was not a product of the genius of the Framers to balance national and state
authority and thereby preserve liberty. It was imposed on them by the
smaller states and the slave states in combination and was accepted only to
avoid a breakup of the Constitutional Convention. Federalism emerged as
an accident of history, and not as a brainstorm of profound political thinkers
intent on securing republican government.
Federalism for the smaller states meant that they would have a direct
share in running the national government. They had no desire to cripple the
national government, because now it was their government. In contrast to
Madison’s legislative veto over state legislation, which the Convention re-
jected, the smaller states had gained a form of veto over national legislation
by virtue of the changes they extracted from the Constitutional Convention.
With their sovereignty and independence assured, they had turned the fed-
eral government around so that the scheme for a unitary government resting
on a popular vote in both legislative houses that favored the larger states
was abandoned in favor of a government more accommodating to their
wishes. Their keen satisfaction with the outcome of the Philadelphia Con-
vention is revealed by the speed and near unanimous vote by which their
ratifications of the Constitution were secured. Furthermore, none of the
smaller states attached a demand for amendments to its ratification, as did
some of the larger states subsequently. As Charles Warren has said: “Hav-
ing won their contention as to equality of votes in the Senate, they were
now willing to join hands with their opponents in making the Congress an
adequate body.”205
In light of this analysis of the source of federalism in the American
Constitution, the thesis espoused by Wechsler, Choper, Amar, and Kramer,
on the “political safeguards” of federalism, deserves closer scrutiny and
greater appreciation.206 Their thesis is reflected in the conclusion of the
Garcia decision that overruled National League of Cities and declared that
204. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 514.
205. Warren, supra note 165, at 316.
206. See Herbert Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDA-
MENTAL LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 1961); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NA-
TIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1980); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics
Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM L. REV. 215 (2000); and Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J., 1425 (1987). See also Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96
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“the principal and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inher-
ent in all congressional action—the built-in restraints that our system pro-
vides through state participation in federal governmental action.”207 It
echoes the words of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland,
when he said: “The people of all the states, and the states themselves, are
represented in congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power
[of taxation].”208
From the postulate of the New Federalism, that the Constitutional Con-
vention designed the federal system of government as one of two means of
precluding tyranny, it follows that the Convention not only recognized state
sovereignty but also was committed to protecting that sovereignty. And
when the Court acts to forestall federal encroachment on state authority, it
is simply ensuring that the sovereignty accorded the states is duly respected.
Again, in light of the Convention minutes, it is difficult to uphold this line
of thought, particularly when it enjoins the application of general federal
laws to state instrumentalities.
It can hardly be denied that abridgement of state sovereignty was a
major purpose of the Philadelphia Convention. As the Court said in the
Garcia opinion: “The States unquestionably do ‘retain a significant measure
of sovereign authority.’ They do so, however, only to the extent that the
Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred
those powers to the Federal Government.”209 An effective national govern-
ment could not emerge unless state sovereignty was subordinated to the
national authority. The Supremacy Clause resoundingly confirms this pro-
position. As Akhil Reed Amar wrote: “The supremacy clause clinches the
case.”210 Gouverneur Morris expressed Federalist sentiment in rather
graphic terms. “State attachments, and State importance have been the bane
of this Country. We cannot annihilate; but we may perhaps take out the
teeth of the serpents.”211 Subsequently, Gouverneur Morris described the
aims of the Convention as follows: “Shortly after the Convention met, there
was a serious discussion on the importance of arranging a national system
COLUM L. REV. 121 (1996) (highlighting “the crucial role reserved for the states in the newly
established constitutional order.”).
207. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985)
208. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 435.
209. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 549.
210. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 206, at 1458. One writer has aptly
written: “Dual federalism . . . suggests that federalism is a principle of coequal sovereignty – one
sovereign nation and fifty sovereign states. The fact that this formula has no obvious congruence
with Article 6 of the Constitution – the supremacy clause – poses no apparent difficulty to its
supporters.” ROBERT W. HOFFERT, A POLITICS OF TENSIONS: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS xi–xii (Univ. Press of Colorado 1992). For a critical analysis of
dual federalism from the standpoint of political theory, see Sotorios A. Barber, Defending Dual
Federalism: A Self-Defeating Act (2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1902970 (delivered at 2011 American Political Science Association annual meeting in Seattle).
211. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 530.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\12-1\UST107.txt unknown Seq: 38 14-JAN-16 12:30
2015] NEW FEDERALISM IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 215
of sufficient strength to operate, in despite of State opposition, and yet not
strong enough to break down State authority.”212
Moreover, the claim that the states were sovereign at the birth of the
United States was categorically denied by the majority of delegates to the
Convention. Their pre-Constitution status was famously described by Rufus
King of Massachusetts:
The States were not “sovereigns” in the sense contended for by
some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty.
They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties.
Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they
could not speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were
deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such Sover-
eign. They had not even the organs or faculties of defense or of-
fence, for they could not of themselves raise troops, or equip
vessels, for war. . . . If the States therefore retained some portion
of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested themselves of es-
sential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in some re-
spects – they formed a Nation in others.213
Madison likewise denied that the states had ever enjoyed complete
sovereignty. Under the Confederacy, the states’ laws were akin to bylaws,
he said, and all agree that “under the proposed Govt. the {powers of the
States} will be much farther reduced.”214 In Yates’ notes for that date,
Madison’s comments are only slightly sharper. “Some contend that states
are sovereign, when in fact they are only political societies. There is a gra-
dation of power in all societies, from the lowest corporation to the highest
sovereign. The states never possessed the essential rights of sovereignty.
These were always vested in Congress.”215
212. 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 421. In a letter from Gouverneur Morris to W.
H. Wells on Feb. 24, 1815, Morris also noted a short speech that he delivered to the Convention
on that occasion: “Mr. President; if the rod of Aaron do not swallow the rods of the Magicians, the
rods of the Magicians will swallow the rod of Aaron.” Id.
213. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 323–24. Rufus King’s statement was later cited
by Justice Sutherland in United States. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
214. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 464.
215. Id. at 471. In 1821, Madison took strong exception to Yates’ notes that were published
that year, and suggested that they reflected the “warped” views of the New York delegates who
were opposed to “the contemplated change in the federal system.” See two letters by Madison on
the Yates notes, 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 446–48. However, when one looks at
Madison’s own notes for the same date, June 29, they closely parallel the Yates version, and so
both have been cited in the text. See 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 461–470. Quite
simply, as already indicated, the Madison of 1821 differed greatly from the Madison who pro-
moted and dominated the 1787 Constitutional Convention. Madison’s minutes were only pub-
lished posthumously, in 1836. He had rejected every suggestion that he publish his minutes during
his lifetime, and he gave various reasons for his stand. Many contend that he simply did not want
people to know how nationalist he had been at Philadelphia. See, e.g., the DREW R. MCCOY, THE
LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY 85–89 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1989).
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In sum, whatever sovereignty meant under the Articles of Confedera-
tion, the creation of the national government determined that state sover-
eignty would be severely curtailed under the Constitution. Besides specific
prohibitions on the states in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, na-
tional legislation in spheres assigned to Congress would extend throughout
the nation and would override any contrary manifestation of state will or
sovereignty. As Akhil Amar observed, “the word ‘sovereignty’ never ap-
pears in the Constitution, not even in the Tenth Amendment.”216 Thus, to
assess the scope of state sovereignty is to beg the question—it is whatever
the legislation of the national government has not legitimately preempted
and applied nationwide.
And this brings us to the argument that Congress is not empowered to
commandeer the states, or their personnel, to fulfill and execute federal pro-
grams. It will be recalled that under Article 6 of the Virginia Plan, Congress
was to possess extensive authority vis-a`-vis the states.217 In addition to in-
heriting all the powers of the Confederation Congress, it was to be empow-
ered to legislate where the individual states were incompetent or where
national harmony would be affected by separate legislation. It could veto all
state legislation that conflicted with the Constitution and use force against a
recalcitrant state. As noted earlier, the original text of this article—minus
the authority to use force against delinquent states—was endorsed by the
Convention at least three times. The clause empowering the national legis-
lature to exercise all the powers vested in the Confederation Congress, in-
cluding the right to legislate for the states to implement federal directives,
was retained throughout all the deliberations on the draft resolutions prepar-
atory to their consolidation into a draft constitution. In other words, even
when the Convention abandoned the notion of applying force against a de-
linquent state, the scope of legislative authority of the Confederation di-
rected to the states, was preserved.218 The fact that it was now accepted that
legislation would primarily be directed to individuals did not affect reten-
tion of the legislative power directed to the states, as such.
When the Proceedings of the Convention were conveyed to the Com-
mittee of Detail for resolution on July 23, it included the stipulation, “[t]hat
the Legislature of the United States ought to possess the legislative Rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation.”219 The express formula preserv-
ing authority to legislate for the states was only eliminated when all the
heads of power were replaced with a list of powers by the Committee of
Detail. The question that arises is whether, by this act, the Convention
meant to abandon the power to legislate for the states. In the Constitution
there is no specific formula that asserts that Congress may legislate only for
216. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 206, at 1456.
217. See discussion of the Virginia Plan, supra.
218. See 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 225.
219. 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 131.
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individuals, and not for the states. Nor does the general declaration that
“[t]he Congress shall have power” etc., warrant such a conclusion. So long
as Congress possesses the authority to legislate on a particular topic, its rule
would thus legitimately extend throughout the nation. There would seem to
be no constitutional grounds for excluding any part or province from such
federal reach.
Interestingly, in the Convention debates there does appear a specific
reference—unnoticed in the literature—regarding the concept of also com-
mandeering the states. In the course of discussing the New Jersey and Vir-
ginia Plans, William Davie of North Carolina remarked: “We were partly
federal, partly national in our Union. And he did not see why the Govt.
might {not} in some respects operate on the States, in others on the peo-
ple.”220 No one contradicted him, and there is no reason to believe that the
Convention had abandoned the right to enlist state action as well as popular
action, when required.
Further evidence that Congress was to retain the power to command
the states even while it was empowered to command individuals, would
seem to arise from the issue of requisitions. Those states proposing the
adoption of amendments invariably proposed that before Congress imposed
taxes on individuals, the states be enabled to pay requisitions. Thus, the
draft amendment of New York reads as follows: “That Congress do not lay
direct Taxes . . . until Congress shall first have made a Requisition upon the
States to assess levy and pay their respective proportions of such Requisi-
tion.”221 The formulation in this New York draft and in all the other similar
draft amendments clearly implies that Congress retains the right and power
to impose requisitions on the states, even though direct taxes were to apply
to individuals. The right to requisition is, of course, classic commandeering.
There is no suggestion that the draft provision is empowering Congress to
make requisitions; it presumes that Congress possesses the power and is
requiring requisitions. The implication is clear that Congress has preserved
the power to requisition and commandeer the states as before.
As noted earlier,222 in his dissent in New York v. United States, Justice
Stevens likewise argued that there was no basis, either in the history of the
Constitutional Convention or in the final constitutional provisions, for the
“incorrect and unsound” conclusion that “the Federal Government may not
also impose its will upon the several States as it did under the Articles.” In
his view, the Constitution had “enhanced, rather than diminished, the power
of the Federal Government.” It was “incorrect and unsound,” he said, “to
220. 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 488.
221. TANSILL, supra note 149, at 1039.
222. See supra.
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assert that Congress could not command a state to implement legislation
enacted by Congress.”223
A contrary viewpoint would appear to have been expressed by Oliver
Ellsworth at the Connecticut Ratifying Convention. Ellsworth had been a
delegate to the Philadelphia Convention and, moreover, had served there as
one of the five members of the Committee of Detail that formulated and
defined the powers of Congress.224 Subsequently, he served for a period as
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.225 In addressing the Connecticut
Convention, he said: “The only question is, shall it be a coercion of law, or
a coercion of arms? . . . I am for coercion by law – that coercion which acts
only upon delinquent individuals. This Constitution does not attempt to co-
erce sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity. No coercion is ap-
plicable to such bodies, but that of an armed force.”226
It would appear that Ellsworth’s remarks were premised on the as-
sumption that only the use of armed force could compel a state to fulfill an
edict of the federal government. It is unclear whether he is arguing that the
Constitution precludes the possibility of a federal directive to state authori-
ties. He postulates that only two alternatives exist: coercion of the individ-
ual or coercion of the state. The former is to be preferred, he says, since to
coerce a state would have the “necessary consequence” of “a war of the
states, one against another,” and this the Constitution abjured.227 If force
was uncalled for, as would apply under the judicial system of the United
States, there would appear to be no reason why an Act of Congress could
not apply to a state.
D. State Sovereignty between the Tenth Amendment and the Necessary
and Proper Clause
To protect state interests and sovereignty, Supreme Court Justices have
placed key emphasis on the Tenth Amendment and have imparted a disposi-
223. 505 U.S. 144, 210, 211 (1992). See also the criticism of the Court majority by (retired)
Justice Stevens in his article, Should We Have a New Constitutional Convention? 15 N. Y. REV.
OF BOOKS 9, 20–22 (2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/should-we-
have-new-constitutional-convention/.
224. See 2 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 97, 106.
225. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 53, at app. B-1.
226. 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 553 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976); see also 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 241; reprinted in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 883 (Bernard Bailyn ed., The Library of America 1993).
227. Madison, in his October 24 letter to Jefferson after the Philadelphia Convention, also
expressed the same thought. A “compulsive” system of government, he wrote, could only be
introduced against individuals, not states, for if armed force were to be applied against states it
would produce “a scene resembling much more a civil war, than the administration of a regular
government.” Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 207 (Robert A. Rutland, et al. eds., The Univ. of Chicago Press 1977), http://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0151; see 1 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note
152, at 54.
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tive effect to that Amendment where none had previously been held to ex-
ist. As Mark Killenbeck observed, for those Justices promoting the New
Federalism, the Tenth Amendment “is lionized as an embodiment of a
newly robust conception of state sovereignty that seems on occasion to hold
an almost mystical meaning.”228 Or, to quote Linda Greenhouse of the New
York Times: “The Tenth Amendment was the constitutional frog that turned
into a prince. A kiss by the Supreme Court had lifted the amendment from
decades of scorn and neglect.”229
Thus, in Alden v. Maine,230 Justice Kennedy, for the majority, wrote:
“Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign enti-
ties is removed by the Tenth Amendment.231 . . . The federal system . . .
preserves the sovereign status of the States. . . . It reserves to them a sub-
stantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together with the dig-
nity and essential attributes inhering in that status.”232 Kennedy went on to
say: “When Congress legislates in matters affecting the States, it may not
treat these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations. Congress
must accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in a federal
system.”233
Earlier, in New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor, in the major-
ity opinion she authored, stated: “The Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given
instance, reserve power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us
to determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power.”234 In conclusion, Justice
O’Connor referred to the Tenth Amendment to confirm that the Constitu-
tion explicitly reserved to the States “a residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty.”235 In his 1985 dissent in Garcia, Justice Lewis F. Powell accused
the Court of unjustified disregard of the Tenth Amendment in that case,
declaring: “Today’s decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.”236
228. Mark R. Killenbeck, No Harm in Such a Declaration?, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 97, at 7. For further valuable discussion along these lines, see
Leuchtenberg, supra note 97, at 41–105; and Jack N. Rakove, American Federalism: Was There
an Original Understanding?, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note
97, at 107–29.
229. Leuchtenburg, supra note 97, at 73.
230. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
231. Id. at 713.
232. Id. at 714.
233. Id. at 758. According to Kennedy, “the States entered the federal system with their sover-
eignty intact.” Id. at 713 (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779
(1991)).
234. 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992).
235. Id. at 188.
236. 469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985).
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These references illustrate how the Court majority has employed, or
sought to employ, the Tenth Amendment to restrict national power. The
members of Congress who framed this Amendment would be astonished to
learn how a simple confirmation of residual state powers, to the degree that
state autonomy applies, can be exploited to deny Congress national author-
ity even under a legitimate federal power. Madison explicitly said that the
very structure of the Constitution confirms the reserved powers of the
states, and the Tenth Amendment in no way adds to, or modifies, that basic
fact. Neither he, nor the majority in both houses of Congress who drafted
the Amendment, intended to diminish federal power one iota. As much as
this amendment was designed to assuage state fears about a federal mono-
lith that might abolish the states and produce a consolidated United States,
it was equally designed to confirm the sum total of federal power instituted
under the Constitution, including an unmitigated doctrine of implied pow-
ers. Madison’s purpose in rushing to promote the adoption of the Bill of
Rights, including the Tenth Amendment, was to rescue the Constitution
from even the slightest impairment.
But if the Tenth Amendment has been somewhat glorified by the Court
majority, the Necessary and Proper Clause, it would appear, has suffered a
reverse fate; it has been somewhat denigrated. Ever since the New Deal, the
interstate Commerce Clause had served as a handle for countless federal
programs, thanks to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Recent attempts to
utilize that clause were dismissed as encroachments on state sovereignty.
This was particularly the case where the legislation bore on a subject of
criminal activity, as in the Lopez and Morrison decisions. Criminal law, the
majority held, was peculiarly a state fiefdom, and federal intrusion into that
field held the potential of complete federalization of criminal law as a na-
tional, rather than state, perquisite. The minority Justices, in each case,
would have validated the legislation on the basis of the Commerce Clause
operating in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause. As Justice
Souter said in the Morrison case: “The [Violence Against Women] Act
would have passed muster at any time between Wickard in 1942 and Lopez
in 1995, a period in which the law enjoyed a stable understanding that con-
gressional power under the Commerce Clause, complemented by the au-
thority of the Necessary and Proper Clause, extended to all activity that,
when aggregated, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”237
A perspective that magnifies the status of the Tenth Amendment while
reducing the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause would appear not to
accord with the original intentions of the drafters of these two provisions. In
a word, as noted earlier, it raises the question of how much the New Feder-
alism doctrine really coheres with an Originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation.
237. 529 U.S. 598, 637 (2000).
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Originalist interpretation, it is well recognized, is a subject of consider-
able debate, not only as to whether it is the ideal form of constitutional
interpretation, but as to what original interpretation actually comprises.238
The literature on the relative merits of Originalism is vast.239 However, in
the present case, whatever Originalism has come to mean—whether origi-
nal intent, original meaning, or original understanding240—does not bear on
the subject at hand. The central issue in this article is: what factors led to
the decision to replace the strongly nationalist scheme proposed by the
Founding Fathers with a federal system of government, and what are the
implications of this development? At least, where the intention of the
draftsmen is abundantly clear, it should carry some weight in constitutional
interpretation.
True, James Madison, after embracing the Antifederalist ideology of
his erstwhile opponents in the ratification contest, thought otherwise, but
his argument is open to serious questioning. His emphasis on the conditions
and interpretations stipulated by some of the states when ratifying the Con-
stitution appears misplaced. Why, for example, would the arguments of An-
tifederalists in the state ratifying conventions serve as a satisfactory guide to
interpreting the meaning of any of the provisions of the Constitution? Vari-
ous writers have sought to label the Antifederalists as junior partners in the
drafting of the Constitution and to ascribe the meaning of certain provisions
238. Lawrence B. Solum has written extensively and with keen insight on the subject of
originalism. See LAWRENCE B. SOLUM & ROBERT W. BENNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE (Cornell Univ. Press 2011). See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRE-
TATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (Univ. Press of Kansas
1999); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (Univ. of Oklahoma Press 1987);
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (Macmillan 1988); ROB-
ERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (Free Press
1990); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANING: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CON-
STITUTION (Knopf 1996); Frank B. Cross, The Practical Meaning of Originalism, from SELECTED
WORKS OF FRANK B. CROSS; SOTORIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
239. For a sample of discussions of constitutional interpretation, see Daniel Farber, The
Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1085 (1988); Paul Finkelman,
The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 349 (1989); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B. U.
L. REV. 204 (1980); Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); Phillip B. Kurland, The Constitution: The Framers’ Intent, the Present,
and the Future, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 17 (1987); Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Original
Intention, in THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 1–24 (Robert A.
Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., American Enterprise Inst. 1989); Henry G. Manne, Recon-
ciling Different Views About Constitutional Interpretation, id. at 55–69; Michael Stokes Paulsen,
How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L. J. 2037 (2006); Michael J.
Perry, “Interpreting” the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE 70–92 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., American Enterprise Inst.
1989); Harry M. Clor, Constitutional Interpretation and Regime Principles, id. at 115–35; and
Larry Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be
Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482 (1985).
240. For this three-way classification, see Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 193, at 1134–48.
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of the Constitution to them.241 Other commentators have vigorously re-
jected the attempt to credit the Antifederalists with any effective role in the
formulation of the Constitution. As one authority has said: “Americans are
fortunate that the antifederalists were the failed, defeated, would-be foun-
ders of what would have been a very different kind of nation.”242 Another
writer has articulated it quite summarily: “Anti-Federalists are sometimes
called ‘Other Founders,’ but they did not draft the Constitution, nor influ-
ence its drafting, and they opposed the fixed written document when they
got to see it.”243
On various occasions, Madison contended that the Constitution as it
emerged from Philadelphia was merely a proposal, and its meaning must be
ascertained from the state ratifying conventions. In 1796, addressing the
House of Representatives, he said:
As the instrument came from them [the Framers] it was nothing
more than the draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life
and validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people,
speaking through the several State Conventions. If we were to
look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face
of the instrument, we must look for it, not in the General Conven-
tion, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which ac-
cepted and ratified the Constitution.244
But all of this was propounded when Madison, by then no longer a
Federalist, vigorously opposed the Federalist financial policies pursued by
his former ally, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who en-
joyed the confidence of President Washington. To ascertain the meaning of
a legal document, the contemporaneous comments of its drafters are regu-
larly and justifiably given greater weight than later second thoughts and
debates that do not alter the text. At Philadelphia, the delegates had been
free to adopt, modify, or reject the drafts before them. The state conven-
tions, on the other hand, were presented with the Constitution as a fait ac-
compli, and bidden to accept or reject that document as is. They had no
opportunity to revise anything, and their remarks, even assuming that they
paralleled those of delegates in other states, were nothing more than com-
mentary. They did not affect the meaning imparted to the adoption of the
document by its authors at its birth. They effected no changes in the text of
the Constitution; they only succeeded in extracting a promise for the addi-
tion of Constitutional amendments—which became the Bill of Rights. But,
241. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM & THE DISSENTING
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1999) (and the works cited
therein in the Introduction and Epilogue).
242. Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If Anything, From
the Antifederalists?, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 849, 854 (2001).
243. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 133 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
244. 3 FARRAND RECORDS, supra note 152, at 374.
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as noted earlier, in proposing the Bill of Rights, Madison declared categori-
cally that the Tenth Amendment added nothing new and that it only reaf-
firmed the relationship that was instituted between federal and state powers
under the Constitution. As summed up by Bernard Bailyn: “How the Anti-
federalists’ views explain the Constitution that was adopted over their ob-
jections has not been made clear.”245
There are also weighty considerations that Madison apparently over-
looked in arguing that only the debates in the state ratifying conventions
determine the meaning of the provisions of the Constitution. It is illuminat-
ing, in this context, to examine Madison’s initial statement, made in the
House of Representatives on February 2, 1791, and recorded in his Papers.
In opposing the administration’s bill on the establishment of the Bank of the
United States, he stated:
The powers not given were retained; and . . . those given were not
to be extended by remote implications. . . . The explanations in
the state conventions all turned on the same fundamental princi-
ple, and on the principle that the terms necessary and proper gave
no additional powers to those enumerated. (Here he read sundry
passages from the debates of the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
North-Carolina conventions, shewing the grounds on which the
constitution had been vindicated by its principal advocates,
against a dangerous latitude of its powers, charged by its
opponents.)246
To which states and debates was Madison referring? In accordance
with Article VII, the Constitution came into force on June 21, 1788, when
New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify. Of those nine states, six
(Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Mary-
land) had ratified without any proposals for amendments. The suggestion
for amendments arose only at the Massachusetts Convention, which “rec-
ommended” a series of amendments. Throughout the ratification campaign,
no state was allowed to make its ratification subject to conditions. New
York tried countless times to introduce a variety of conditions but was re-
fused each time.247 Madison made it absolutely clear that ratification had to
245. BERNARD BAILYN, TO BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW: THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF THE
AMERICAN FOUNDERS 128 (Vintage 2003).
246. James Madison, The Bank Bill, [2 Feb.] 1791, in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 380
(Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., Univ. Press of Virginia 1981), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0282.
247. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (July 19, 1788), in 11 THE PA-
PERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 188 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., Univ. Press of
Virginia 1977), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0130; Letter from
James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (July 20, 1788), in 11 id. at 189, http://founders.archives
.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0131. In an address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention on
June 24, 1788, Madison explained why Virginia could not demand amendments to the Constitu-
tion as a condition for ratification. Suppose eight states had already ratified, “the difficulty attend-
ing it will be immense. Every state, which had decided it, must take up the subject again.” Each
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be unqualified. Each of the remaining seven states came up with “recom-
mended” amendments. The key amendment that they sought was a reserved
powers amendment. Five of the seven recommended that the word “ex-
pressly” be stipulated in this amendment, so that the federal government
would be limited to those powers “expressly” enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. Virginia and North Carolina made no such stipulation, Madison hav-
ing categorically rejected any such proposal, just as he would later reject it
in Congress during the debate over the draft reserved powers amendment.
Both Houses of Congress adopted the Madisonian version, and this is the
formula that was ratified by the number of states required for its entry into
force as the Tenth Amendment.
Madison’s reference to the debates in the states of Pennsylvania, Vir-
ginia and North Carolina, is particularly puzzling. Pennsylvania ratified
without any proposal for amendments. Virginia and North Carolina ratified
after the Constitution had gone into effect with ratification by nine states.
How, then, can it be said that the Constitution was adopted subject to the
conditions enunciated in their ratifying conventions? Granted, Virginia’s
ratification was crucial to the future of the Union, but the Constitution was
already in force, so what does belated accession by one or two states deter-
mine with regard to constitutional interpretation? And who was qualified to
commit the United States to anything? In drawing up his draft Bill of Rights
for approval by two-thirds of Congress, Madison disregarded eighty or
ninety percent of the state proposals, and especially those designed to mod-
ify federal power, that the proponents had stamped as vital. The ones that he
did incorporate were only those, including the Tenth, that would in no way
affect the Constitution.
What is one to make of this whole saga? Six states, a clear majority of
the nine required for entry into force of the Constitution, ratified without
any amendments. The appeals for amendments by the other seven states
were only suggestions, and they certainly could not bind the initial six. Five
of the seven states proposed the term “expressly,” something that was delib-
erately excluded in the proposed list of amendments presented by the two
other states, as Madison insisted. Hence, eight states abjured requiring in-
clusion of the term “expressly” in the text of the Tenth Amendment.
Madison denied any suggestion that the Tenth Amendment was a repeat of
Article II of the Articles of Confederation. In sum, the Tenth Amendment,
as Madison emphasized in the congressional debate, merely confirmed the
existing state of affairs under the Constitution and did not modify any of the
powers of Congress in any way. Thus, it preserved the full scope of the
state would be free to propose its own new amendments and the process would be endless. James
Madison, Ratification Without Conditional Amendments, in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
172–77 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., Univ. Press of Virginia 1977), http://
founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-11-02-0110. See also Letter from James Madison
to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 10, 1788), in id. at 19.
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Necessary and Proper Clause which, as Chief Justice Marshall said in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, was clearly designed to expand, not contract, congres-
sional powers. An implied powers doctrine was thus a fundamental part of
the Constitution.
No clear expression of opinion regarding the provisions of the Consti-
tution emerges from all, or even the majority, of the state conventions, and
in vain does one search for a common interpretation of any particular provi-
sion. We know what the Antifederalists wanted, and we know that they
voted against ratification, even with Madison’s promises. We do not know
how many delegates to the ratifying conventions would have voted for rati-
fication even absent any promises. So how relevant are the supposed “com-
mitments?” As Kesavan and Paulsen have argued: “[H]ow can one rely on
particular utterances in the Virginia ratifying convention, unknown to those
in all preceding ratifying conventions?”248 And as far as the Tenth Amend-
ment is concerned, the only thing that was common to those recommending
a reserved powers clause was the demand for inclusion of the term “ex-
pressly,” and this was repudiated by Madison himself.249
The Constitutional Convention created a nation in 1787, albeit that it
made vital concessions to the smaller and slave states. The nationalizing
factor was current throughout the Constitutional Convention, and as a re-
sult, the final text, even with concessions, reflected the desire of the dele-
gates for a powerful central government within a federal framework. The
Necessary and Proper Clause added flexibility to federal power, and the
Tenth Amendment, correctly read, confirmed that flexibility, while the
Supremacy Clause ensured that no contrary state legislation could cancel
legitimate national legislation.
CONCLUSION
According to Max Farrand, “every provision of the federal constitution
can be accounted for in American experience between 1776 and 1787.”250
In this regard, he said, “the federal constitution was nothing but the applica-
248. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 193, at 1164.
249. Calvin H. Johnson contends: “The program that gives the original meaning to the Consti-
tution is also the proponents’ program, rather than the opposition’s. The Anti-Federalists did not
write the Constitution, they opposed what they saw, and they lost in the only purpose that organ-
ized them – defeating ratification of the Constitution. Their goals explain the Constitution only by
silhouetting it.” JOHNSON, supra note 243, at 5. Robert W. Hoffert has portrayed the implications
of the adoption of the Constitution for local government in the following terms: “Principles of
decentralization, localism, and reduction in the size and dimensions of the national government
are frequently attributed to the 1787 Constitution in spite of the fact that there is no single event in
the entire history of the United States more purposefully contrary to these goals. The Constitution
of 1787 delivered a deadly blow to decentralization, overwhelmed localism, and expanded the
size, complexity, and power of the national government beyond any political, economic, or social
event of the twentieth century.” HOFFERT, supra note 210, at 2.
250. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 204 (Yale
Univ. Press 1913).
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tion of experience to remedy a series of definite defects in the government
under the articles of confederation.”251 Various features of the new consti-
tution reflect the lessons learned. One was the new form of federalism
under which the national government would not be beholden to the states
for its existence. The states, while continuing to survive and thrive, would
no longer be capable of paralyzing the national government by simply fail-
ing to support it. Capping the powers conveyed to Congress was the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, providing a doctrine of implied powers, to ensure
that the national government would have the means to implement policies
within the broader range of its powers. This facilitated considerable expan-
sion of federal power nationwide.
Both federalism and the separation of powers are fundamental ele-
ments of the American system of government inaugurated in 1787–88.
Under the federal arrangements instituted by the Constitution, both levels of
government, the national and the state, have essential roles to play to ensure
the successful functioning of the system of government. And just as cooper-
ation between the three separate branches of government is required for the
effective operation of the federal government, coordination between the
center and the states is needed if the American people are to gain maximum
benefit from the divided system of government. The essence of federalism
was not only acknowledgment of the independent status of the states, but
the principle that they would be integrated into the operation of the national
government. Whereas under the separation of powers there is no mixture of
representation between one branch and another (except for the Vice-Presi-
dent presiding over the Senate), under federalism, particular groups of
states were not only represented like all other states in the national legisla-
ture, they had inordinate representation there. This extraordinary measure of
influence was also carried over into the selection process for a President.
Thus, federalism represented a form of partnership in the decision-making
bodies of the national government that provided for security of state
interests.
But there is an important difference between federalism and the sepa-
ration of powers. Whereas on the federal level the three branches of govern-
ment are equal and independent of one another, in the national-state nexus
the Constitution stipulates that where the national government has author-
ity, it also has supremacy. Ensuring that the national government would
exercise paramountcy over the states was a critical feature of the Federalist
Revolution instituted by the Philadelphia Convention. Nor was this
supremacy affected by the adoption of the Tenth Amendment, which simply
confirmed the federal equation instituted under the Constitution.
The separation of powers is also distinguished from the federal princi-
ple by its ideological genealogy. Both ancient and modern theorists, Aris-
251. Id. at 205.
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totle and Montesquieu, proclaimed the separation of powers as a vital
principle of sound government. As Madison said in Federalist No. 47, “the
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary in the same
hands” could justly be pronounced “the very definition of tyranny.”252 Sep-
arating the three functions of government was designed to secure liberty. In
contrast, federalism in the American system of government had no such
distinguished lineage to portray. Preservation of the states was regarded as a
necessary convenience; it was not a product of any profound theory of po-
litical science. In creating a nation, the Founding Fathers aimed to cure the
United States of the destructive force of separate states, each going its own
way. While content to preserve the independence and sovereignty of the
states, they clearly were intent on subordinating the states to the national
authority. Federalism was shaped, not by design, but because of the paro-
chial demands of two groups of states, the smaller states and the slave
states, that sought protection for their insular interests. Thus, diffusion of
power, while clearly underlying the separation of powers arrangements on
the national level, was not the guiding principle for the Framers in settling
nation-state relations. It came about essentially as an accident of history.
Given the historical and documentary background, it is also clear that
federalism was not designed to frustrate resolution of national problems.
The role of the states in the operation of the national government, it was
felt, would serve as sufficient guarantee for protection of states’ interests.
While the Constitution confirmed that the federal government would reign
supreme, the federal factor would ensure that in ultimate terms, the com-
mon interest would serve both state and nation.
252. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., Wesleyan Univ.
Press 1961).
